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LOCAL FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Carl Tobias* 
Federal civil procedure is now byzantine. Lawyers and parties 
face, and federal judges apply, a bewildering panorama of require-
ments. There are strictures in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as 
well as Title 28 of the United States Code and dozens of substantive 
statutes. A stunning array of local measures-including local rules; 
general, special, and scheduling orders; individual-judge practices; 
and mechanisms that courts adopted under the Civil Justice Reform 
Act (CJRA) of 1990 to reduce cost and delay-also govern cases in all 
ninety-four districts. Many of the provisions· are inconsistent or dupli-
cative, while a significant percentage are difficult to discover, master, 
and satisfy. These phenomena have apparently undermined the fed-
eral rules' core precepts, such as uniformity, simplicity, and economi-
cal, expeditious dispute resolution, and have eroded important 
process values, namely court access. The developments mean that 
federal practice is more fractured than at any time since the Supreme 
Court prescribed the original federal rules during 1938. 
This balkanization of federal civil procedure was not inevitable. 
Indeed, over a decade ago, the Court and Congress instituted actions 
to treat growing fragmentation, particularly the proliferation of con-
flicting local strictures. For example, the 1985 amendment in Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 83 and the JuC:licial Improvements and Access 
to Justice Act (JIA) of 1988 required that the Judicial Conference of 
the United States, circuit judicial councils, federal appellate and dis-
trict courts, and specific judges periodically review local procedures 
for consistency with the federal rules and legislation and abrogate or 
* Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I wish to thank Paul 
Carrington, Dan Coquillette, David Pimentel, Lauren Robel, Peggy Sanner, Steve 
Subrin, and Mary Jo Wiggins for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte 
Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the Harris Trust and Jim Rogers for 
generous, continuing support. I was a member of the Ninth Circuit Local Rules 
Review Committee and of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group for the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Montana; however, the views expressed here and 
errors that remain are mine. 
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modify violative provisions. Few institutions or people have fulfilled 
the responsibilities imposed principally because Congress appropri-
ated no funding and adopted the CJRA, which essentially suspended 
implementation of the duties. This truncated effectuation and experi-
mentation with mechanisms under the 1990 statute, some of which 
contravene the federal rules, United States Code provisions, and re-
quirements in the remaining ninety-three districts, have led to increas-
ingly fractured civil practice. Now that the date on which the CJRA 
was scheduled to expire has passed and federal litigation has become 
more arcane than ever, it is critical to analyze these developments in 
contemporary civil disputing. This Article undertakes that effort. 
The first Part traces the background of local procedural prolifera-
tion, which gradually expanded after the promulgation of the initial 
federal rules and has accelerated since 1980. The exponential in-
crease in local strictures, many of which were conflicting, prompted 
Supreme Court revision of Rule 83 during 1985 and 1995, as well as 
legislative enactment of the JIA in 1988. The Court and Congress 
clearly intended to limit inconsistent and redundant local require-
ments which were complicating federal practice. The second Part 
evaluates implementation of the mandates in Rule 83 and in the 1988 
statute and ascertains that most entities and persons responsible for 
dischar.ging the obligations have not performed them. I then assess 
the reasons for incomplete compliance, which were substantially at-
tributable to resource deficiencies and to the 1990 CJRA's discontin-
ued effectuation of the relevant commands in Rule 83 and the 1988 
JIA, and analyze the consequences of limited implementation. 
The third Part offers suggestions for the future. First, Congress 
should definitely state that the CJRA has expired and that districts and 
judges must abolish all conflicting and repetitive procedures adopted 
under the statute. The institutions and individuals charged with effec-
tuating the mandates related to local proliferation in Rule 83 and the 
JIA should concomitantly reinvigorate and thoroughly implement 
them. For instance, district courts and particular judges could elimi-
nate existing, and refrain from the prescription of, new, local provi-
sions which are inconsiste:r:it or redundant. The circuit councils might 
concomitantly undertake comprehensive review of local strictures and 
abrogate or change those found to conflict with or duplicate federal 
rules or legislation. As the twenty-first century opens, these sugges-
tions should restrict proliferation and the fragmentation of modem 
federal court practice, promote the restoration of a uniform, simple 
procedural regime, and decrease expense and delay in civil litigation. 
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I. A HISTORY OF LOCAL PROCEDURAL PROLIFERATION 
A. Introduction 
The growth of inconsistent and repetitive local requirements that 
eventually fostered Supreme Court amendment of Rule 83 and con-
gressional passage of the ]IA, measures which were meant to limit 
proliferation, warrant considerable evaluation in this Article, even 
though these developments have been rather thoroughly chronicled 
elsewhere.1 Comparatively detailed examination can improve under-
standing of proliferation, why the commands imposed by the rule and 
the statute received little effectuation, and how they might be revital-
ized and fully implemented. 
I emphasize in this Part and throughout the Article proliferating 
local civil procedures that federal district courts and judges have is-
sued and applied, although many other provisions which cover local 
practice in the federal courts are very important and deserve analysis 
and treatment. For example, each United States court of appeals and 
bankruptcy court has promulgated and enforced local strictures. 
Practically all of the ninety-four districts and many judges have corre-
spondingly prescribed and enforced local requirements that govern 
criminal matters, and numerous courts and judges have adopted and 
employed admiralty procedures. A plethora of provisions-variously 
denominated as general, special, scheduling, and minute orders; in-
ternal operating procedures; and measures of specific judges, includ-
ing standing orders and individual-judge practices, which may be 
unwritten-also regulate federal court practice. 
I focus on local district court civil procedures because there are 
more of them, many of which are inconsistent or redundant, while the 
problems that the strictures pose and their efficacious resolution can 
felicitously serve as surrogates for the remaining local requirements. 
Moreover, the systematic collection, analysis, and synthesis of all rele-
vant local measures would be an overwhelming task. Nonetheless, in 
an effort to facilitate future work, I catalog some of the provisions at 
the conclusion of this Part; briefly assess implementation of the local 
review mandates that Civil Rule 83's appellate, bankruptcy, and crimi-
nal analogues and the ]IA imposed at the end of the second Part's first 
Section; and afford suggestions for limiting proliferation of civil pro-
1 See, e.g., Walter W. Heiser, A Critical Review of the Local Ruks of the United States 
District Court for the Soutlzern District of California, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555, 557-64 
(1996); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Ruks, and State Ruks: Uniformity, Diver-
gence and Emergi.ng Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2011-26 (1989). 
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cedures, from which it should be rather easy to extrapolate for other 
applicable local strictures in the third Part. 
B. The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
When Congress adopted the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,. it em-
powered the United States Supreme Court to prescribe procedures 
that would cover civil litigation in every federal district court. 2 In 
1935, the Supreme Court appointed the initial Advisory Committee 
on the Civil Rules and requested that the Committee draft uniform 
provisions which would govern practice in all federal districts. During 
1942, the Court designated the surviving members of this entity as a 
standing Advisory Committee,3 and fourteen years thereafter, the 
Court discharged that group.4 In 1958, Congress assigned the respon-
sibility for advising the Court to the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, the policymaking arm of the federal courts, which concomi-
tantly named a permanent Advisory Committee.5 
The Advisory Committee, when drafting the original Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which the Supreme Court promulgated dur-
ing 1938, seemed to have in mind a number of purposes, although it 
is difficult to divine the precise intent of the fourteen lawyers who 
held varying views on the many issues which they explored. 6 However, 
the attorneys apparently intended to ameliorate the complications 
that common law and code procedure and practice had imposed. 7 
More specifically, the Committee meant to rectify the exceedingly 
technical nature of the earlier procedural schemes which strict plead-
2 See28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074 (1994); seeal50Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Ena-
bling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1024 (1982); Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the 
FederalRulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1655, 1658 (1995); Carl Tobias, Public Law 
Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 270, 272-77 
(1989). 
3· Order Continuing the Advisory Committee, 314 U.S. 720 (1942). 
4 Order Discharging the Advisory Committee, 352 U.S. 803 (1956). 
5 Act of July 1, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 
(1994)). 
6 See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of 
the Rules, 84 YALE LJ. 718 (1975);Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in 
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 498-99, 502-15 (1986); Tobias, supra note 2, at 
272-77. I rely principally on secondary sources to offer an account that is most rele-
vant to proliferation. 
7 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 914-21, 926-73 (1987); 
Tobias, supra note 2, at 270, 272-73. 
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ing typified.8 The drafters concomitantly hoped to reduce the diffi-
culties resulting from the 1872 Conformity Act's mandate that federal 
district judges apply procedures which resembled the strictures em-
ployed by the state courts of the jurisdictions where the federal courts 
were located. 9 
The federal rules seemingly incorporated numerous fundamental 
procedural precepts. The Committee intended to craft a national 
code of procedure which was simple, uniform, and trans-substantive; 
that is "procedure generalized across substantive lines"10 and that fa-
cilitated the inexpensive, prompt disposition of disputes and merit-
based resolution.11 The Committee attempted to realize these pur-
poses through many means. For instance, the Committee promoted 
simplicity and disposition on the merits by reducing the importance 
of pleadings, by providing for broad, flexible discovery, and by limit-
ing the number of steps in cases.12 The Committee correspondingly 
fostered uniformity by commanding all of the federal districts to apply 
identical procedures.13 The drafters also left counsel substantial con-. 
trol over lawsuits, particularly prior to trial and in discovery.14 The 
Committee as weil increased judges' discretion and trusted to this dis-
cretion application of the rules, which the Committee contemplated 
that courts would flexibly and practically interpret and enforce.15 
8 See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pkading Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 439 (1986); Subrin, supra note 7, at 948-73. See 
generally CHARLES E. CLARK, PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID OF JusncE (1965). 
9 Act of June 1, 1872, en. 255, 17 Stat. 196, 197. See generally CHARLES Al.AN 
WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS§ 61 (5th ed. 1994) (discussing the Conformity Act 
Equity Rules). 
10 Cover, supra note 6, at 718. See generally Carl Tobias, The Transformation of 
Trans-Suhstantitrity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1501 (1992). 
11 For analyses of these and other significant goals of the Committee, see Resnik, 
supra note 6, at 502-15; Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 
A.B.A.J. 1648, 1648-51 (1981); and Tobias, supra note 2, at 272-77. 
12 See Subrin, supra note 11, at 1649-50; Tobias, supra note 2, at 274; see also 
Marcus, supra note 8, at 439-40. 
13 See Subrin, supra note 11, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 2, at 274-75. 
14 See Resnik, supra note 6, at 512-15; Subrin, supra note 11, at 1650. 
15 See Subrin, supra note 7, at 968-73; Tobias, supra note 2, at 275-76 & n.28. 
The tenets are not absolutes; some were in tension and even conflicted. The choices 
of an equity-based scheme and of flexible, liberal procedure facilitated court access 
and costly, lengthy complex cases. See Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judi-
cial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1589, 1591 n.3 (1994); infra notes 32, 35-37 
and accompanying text. 
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Critical to local procedural proliferation was the Advisory Com-
mittee's determination to include Rule 83.16 This provision author-
ized all districts and individual judges to prescribe local measures, 
thus empowering them to promulgate local strictures which could 
erode the national, uniform, simple system of civil procedure insti-
tuted.17 The drafters did intend to limit this authorization. The Com-
mittee apparently envisioned that districts would sparingly invoke 
Rule 83 to address unusual, troubling local circumstances18 and ex-
pressly prohibited the adoption of local procedures which conflicted 
with the federal rules.19 
Professor Stephen Subrin has recently afforded a valuable, spe-
cific account of the Advisory Committee's promulgation of Rule 83.20 
He concluded that Congress had expressly granted local rulemaking 
power to the federal trial courts from their inception in 1789 until 
187221 but that passage of the Conformity Act of 1872 reflected legisla-
tive intent to limit this power sharply.22 Notwithstanding Congress's 
·purpose, the Advisory Committee appreciated that local strictures 
under the 1872 statute had "become an important part of the proce-
dural landscape" and that opinion was divided about the degree to 
which this practice should continue under the Rules Enabling Act 
regime.23 
Professor Subrin found Advisory Committee deliberations and 
proposals to suggest that the "drafters saw a necessity for local rules to 
meet local conditions and for some body of law to fill the gaps not 
covered by the federal rules."24 Rule 83's final version enabled a ma-
jority of the judges in every district to prescribe local rules that did not 
conflict with other applicable law but rejected a provision for a super-
visory entity, such as appellate courts, to monitor these procedures.25 
Professor Subrin also stated that the phrasing of Rule 83 "might be 
16 See FED. R. Crv. P. 83, 308 U.S. 765 (1938); see also Subrin, supra note 1, at 
2016-19. 
17 See FED. R. Crv. P. 83; see also supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text. 
18 See FED. R. Crv. P. 83 advisory committee's note (1937 adoption); see also Suh-
rin, supra note 1, at 2011-16. 
19 See FED. R. Crv. P. 83; see also Carl Tobias, Civil justice Reform and the Balkaniza-
tion of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 Aruz. ST. LJ. 1393, 1397-99 (1992). 
20 Subrin, supra note 1, at 2011-16. 
21 Id. at 2012; see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF CouRT RuLE-MAKING PROCE-
DURES 117 (1977). 
22 Subrin, supra note 1, at 2011-12; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
23 Subrin, supra note 1, at 2012-13. 
24 Id. at 2013. 
25 See FED. R. Crv. P. 83; see also Subrin, supra note 1, at 2014. 
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expected to result in material nonuniformity among district courts 
under the emerging new scheme."26 
. C. The First Three Decades of the Federal Rul,es 
The national rule revision entities, especially the Advisory Com-
mittee, and federal judges maintained and promoted the essential 
procedural precepts, namely uniformity and simplicity, during the 
three decades after the federal rules' promulgation in 1938, and judi-
cial officials and scholars generally accorded the original rules a warm 
reception. 27 The Advisory Committee suggested a comparatively 
small number of amendments, and judges experienced few problems 
construing and applying the initial rules and lauded their effective-
ness. 28 The judiciary sustained simplicity with a general notice plead-
ing regime that it practically and flexibly enforced,29 while numerous 
districts and individual judges preserved and fostered uniformity by 
limiting the local prescription of strictures, particularly requirements 
that conflicted with the federal rules.30 
Some of the rules which the Supreme Court promulgated in 1938 
enjoyed less efficacy, and their judicial application seemingly under-
mined several fundamen~ procedural. tenets during the ensuing 
thirty years.31 For instance, broad discovery prompted certain 
problems, namely greater expense and delay, and a number of attor-
neys abused lawyer control over this process in ways that disadvan-
taged their adversaries, especially in complicated lawsuits. 32 
Most applicable to local procedural proliferation was the willing-
ness of numerous district courts and individual judges to adopt local 
requirements, particularly strictures that contravened the federal 
rules or acts of Congress, thus honoring in the breach Rule 83's prohi-
26 Subrin, supra note l, at 2016. 
27 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1592-93; Tobias, supra note 2, at 277-79. 
28 See generally Charles E. Clark, "Clarijjing" Amendments to the Federal Ru1£s, 14 
OHIO ST. LJ. 241 (1953); Symposium, The Federal Ru1£s of Civil Procedure: 1938-1958,' 
58 CoLUM. L. REv. 435 (1958); see also generally Marcus, supra note 8, at 439-40; To-
bias, supra note 2, at 277-78 (discussing the federal rules during the first quarter 
century). 
29 See, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944); see also Mar-
cus, supra note 8, at 439-40, 445-46. 
30 See Subrin, supra note 1, at 2016-19; see also infra notes 33-34 and accompany-
ing text. 
31 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1593; Tobias, supra note 2, at 278. 
32 See, e.g., New Dyckman Theater Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheus Corp., 16 F.R.D. 
203, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); see also Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions To Effectuate Pretrial 
Discovery, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 480, 480-~l (1958) (1950s account); Subrin, supra note 
7, at 982-84 (later account). 
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bition on inconsistency.33 In fact, during 1940, a brief two years after 
the Court prescribed the original rules, the Knox Committee deter-
mined that districts and judges had failed to abolish a significant num-
ber of conflicting local rules which antedated Rule 83's issuance and 
had even implemented some inconsistent local rules after the 1938 
federal rules' promulgation.34 This local procedural proliferation 
eroded national uniformity, simplicity, and trans-substantivity. In 
short, district courts and specific judges relied upon Rule 83, which its 
drafters intended would provide flexibility to treat peculiar, problem-
atic local circumstances and whose use was hedged with proscriptions, 
especially on the application of conflicting local strictures, to adopt 
local requirements that promoted inconsistency and complexity. 
D. The Federal Rules Since the 1970s 
By the 1970s, a number of developments had fostered increasing 
disenchantment with the federal rules. Some observers contended 
that the federal courts were encountering a "litigation explosion,"35 
whereby counsel and parties were pursuing too many civil lawsuits, a 
number of which lacked merit.36 Additional critics found troubling 
the abuse of the litigation process, particularly in discovery, by lawyers 
and clients. 37 Certain judges and attorneys argued that the federal 
rules were unresponsive to these difficulties and that a few features of 
the initial rules, namely their flexible, open-ended character,38 espe-
cially during discovery, might even have led to the complications. Lo-
cal procedures became important vehicles for implementing several 
solutions-such as increased emphasis on managerial judging and on 
the pretrial process and enhanced judicial discretion-which districts 
33 See Subrin, supra note 1, at 2016-19; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 83; supra notes 
16-19 and accompanying text. 
34 See REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON LOCAL Dis. 
TRICT CouRT RuLEs III, at 1-11 (1940). See generally Subrin, supra note l, at 2016-19 
(discussing the Knox Committee Report). 
35 See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D-A Need for Systematic Antidpa-
tion, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 23 (A. Leo 
Levin & Russell Wheeler eds., 1979) [hereinafter THE POUND CONFERENCE]; Francis R. 
Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, in id. at 211-12; 
see also Tobias, supra note 2, at 287-89 (discussing debate over litigation explosion). 
36 See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979); Arthur R. Miller, 
The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REv. l, 3-5 (1984). 
37 See, e.g., Order Amending the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000 
(1980) (Powell,]., dissenting); Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 
639, 643 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 
(1975). 
38 See sources cited supra notes 28, 35-37. 
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and judges applied in attempting to rectify the problems identified in 
this paragraph. 
1. Managerial Judging 
In the latter half of the 1970s, numerous judges, primarily in trial 
courts serving large populations or metropolitan areas, such as the 
Northern Districts of California and Illinois and the Southern District 
of New York, began developing ad hoc remedies for these difficulties, 
a practice that some observers called "managerialjudging."39 Courts 
and judges invented a number of measures that promoted more active 
judicial involvement in civil litigation, particularly its pretrial phase. 
Districts and judges used pretrial conferences to control the pace of 
lawsuits, to clarify and resolve issues in contention, and to promote 
s.ettlement, especially by invoking a broad spectrum of alternatives to 
dispute resolution (ADR). 40 Quite a few judges attempted to manage 
more rigorously the scope or timing of discovery, and some imposed 
sanctions on counsel or clients for abusing the discovery or litigation 
processes.41 Moreover, certain courts and judicial officials created 
new mechanisms, such as mini-trials and mandatory summary jury tri-
als, to treat the complications.42 Numerous districts and individual 
judges practiced much managerial judging before the 1983 federal 
rules amendments by promulgating local procedural requirements, 
many of which contravened the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or 
United States Code .provisions. 
2. The 1983 Federal Rules Amendments 
The 1983 revisions to Rules 11, 16, and 26 expanded attorneys' 
responsibilities as officers of the court, enlarged judicial discretion to 
control and manage lawsuits, principally during the pretrial phase and 
39 See, e.g., STEVEN FLANDERS, CAsE MANAGEMENT AND CouRT MANAGEMENT IN 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1977); Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation 
and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 647, 657-78 (1988). See generally 
Judith Resnik, Managerial judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374 (1982) (assessing managerial 
judging). 
40 See Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Movement, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 424, 437 (1986); Robert F. Peckham, The Fed-
eral Judge as a Case Manager: The New Ro'fe in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 
CAL. L. REv. 770, 770-79 (1981); Resnik, supra note 39, at 391-400. 
41 See Peckham, suJn:a note 40, at 795-804; Resnik, supra note 39, at 391-400. 
42 See E. ALLAN LIND & JoHN E. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBI-
TRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983); Frank E. Sander, Varieties of Dis-
pute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976) (addressing the National Conference on the 
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice). 
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discovery, and required that judges impose sanctions when lawyers or 
litigants violated the amendments' commands.43 Revised Rule 16 in-
creased district judges' authority to manage lawsuits by relying on pre-
trial conferences and scheduling orders and by empowering courts to 
sanction those who contravened the amendment's requirements, 
while revised Rule 26 authorized judges to restrict discovery's scope 
and pace and to levy sanctions for violations of the provision's man-
dates.44 The new version of Rule 11 supplemented the Rule 16 and 26 
prescriptions for managerial judging by mandating that courts sanc-
tion attorneys and parties for failing to conduct reasonable inquiries 
before they filed papers and increased the duties and accountability of 
counsel.45 These modifications, therefore, essentially codified certain 
practices which courts had employed under, the rubric of managerial 
judging, even as the changes empowered judges to adopt conflicting 
local strictures and facilitated the erosion of national uniformity and 
simplicity, significant precepts that underlay the initial federal rules. 
For example, the 1983 amendments in Rules 16 and 26 and the 1985 
Manual for Complex Litigation, Second-which prescribed different pro-
cedures for resolving specific types of cases, such as complex and "or-
dinary" litigation-assumed that judges would tailor measures, often 
ad hoc, to particular kinds of suits,46 thereby multiplying the possibili-
ties for inconsistent local requirements' prescription.47 
3. Local Procedural Proliferation 
a. How Local Proliferation Occurred 
Numerous phenomena examined above contributed to the 
proliferation of local procedures that has transpired since adoption of 
the 1938 federal rules but which apparently became so problematic by 
the 1980s that thejudicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and Con-
gress felt compelled to respond.48 In 1986, the Conference commis-
sioned the Local Rules Project to collect, organize, and evaluate all of 
43 See Order Amending Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983). See 
generally ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CAsE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER REsPONSIBIL-
ITI (1984) (assessing the 1983 revisions). 
44 See Order Amending Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. at 1097; see also In re 
Sanjuan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Lit., 859 F.2d 1007, 1011-13 (1st Cir. 1988); Sub-
rin, supra note 11, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 2, at 292 n.148. 
45 See Order Amending Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. at 1097. 
46 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION SECOND§§ 33.1-.6 (1985). 
47 See Subrin, supra note 11, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 2, at 292 n.148. 
48 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1397-99; Carl Tobias, More Modern Civil Process, 56 
U. PITT. L. REv. 801, 817 (1995); see also supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
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the existing local rules, standing orders, and additional practices of · 
individual judges and other local measures to ascertain whether the 
strictures were creating difficulties and, if so, to formulate recommen-
dations for addressing those problems.49 Three years later, the Pro-
ject published a report stating that districts and judges had adopted 
approximately 5000 local rules and many additional requirements, di-
versely described as general, standing, scheduling, special, or :rp.inute 
orders-numerous of which were unwritten-that covered local prac-
tice.50 Some procedures were inconsistent with the federal rules, acts 
of Congress, or measures in the re.maining courts.51 Districts and spe-
cific judges promulgated and applied conflicting strictures, despite 
prohibitions on doing so in Federal Rule 83 and the Rules Enabling 
Act.52 
The Local Rules Project determined that the local commands 
governed a wide spectrum of procedural issues. The most broadly 
prescribed requirements pertained to the pretrial process, especially 
pretrial conferences and discovery. 53 A number of districts and judges 
employed special techniques for tracking and attempting to conclude 
relatively early in litigation, routine, simple lawsuits, such as social se-
curity appeals, while a significant percentage of courts imposed pre-
sumptive numerical restrictions on interrogatories.54 
The su~stantive content of the local measures and the provision 
made for their adoption, communication, and application seemed 
more responsive to the needs of judges, attorneys, and parties in the 
local districts or of those judges vis-a-vis the counsel and litigants, than 
to national uniformity and simplicity. For instance, a number of dis-
.trict courts imposed rather onerous requirements on lawyers who 
wished to practice in the districts but were not members of the bars of 
49 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., COMM. ON RuLES OF PRACTICE AND PRO· 
CEDURE, REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL PRACTICE 
(1989) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE LOCAL RuLES PROJECT]; Daniel R. Coquillette .et 
al., The &le of Local Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62, 62-65 (1989) (summarizing the Project). 
50 See REPORT OF THE LoCAL RuLES PROJECT, supra note 49, at l; see also U.S. Dis. 
TRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MoNT., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDuc 
TION PLAN 3-4 (1991) (applying unwritten measures). 
51 See Subrin, supra note l, at 2025. ' 
52 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (a) (1994); FED. R. CIV. P. 83; see also Subrin, supra note 1, 
at 2020-26. See generally Coquillette et al., supra note 49, at 62-65 (summarizing the 
Project). 
53 See REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 49, at 1-3. 
54 See 14JAMES WM. MooRE ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE§ 83.02 (3d ed. 1996) [here-
inafter MooRE's 3d]; see also Subrin, supra note i', at 2020-26. 
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the jurisdictions in which the courts were situated.55 A few specific 
judges even mandated that counsel obtain their permission prior to 
filing motions.56 Some courts and individual judges prescribed and 
enforced strictures covering important aspects of practice without 
seeking any input from the bar or the public before, and occasionally 
after, publishing measures.5 7 
Appellate courts rarely examined the promulgation or invocation 
of these requirements.58 The tiny financial stakes, and the abstract 
procedural principles, that typically were at issue may well have dis-
suaded many attorneys and parties from challenging the measures. 
Even those who might have had the requisite resources and interest to 
seek the strictures' invalidation could have been unwilling to jeopard-
ize ongoing, cordial relationships with judges in whose courts they 
would later appear. Some of the few potential challenges that re-
mained may have implicated unreviewable judicial decisions.59 
This account of proliferating local requirements shows how in-
creasing emphasis on the pretrial process and enhanced judicial dis-
cretion to manage it were concomitants of proliferation. The 
widespread adoption of local provisions by districts and judges corre-
spondingly undermined the national, uniform procedural regime in-
stituted in the federal rules, imposed unnecessary expense and delay, 
and complicated civil practice, particularly by making it more difficult 
to discover, comprehend, and comply with the growing number of 
inconsistent and repetitive requirements.60 
55 See, e.g., D. MONT. R. llO; E.D. VA. R. 7; see also Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 
643 (1987). See generally RICHARD A. WILLIAMSON, NEwYoRK CouN"IY LAWYERS' Assoc1-
ATION REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE FEDERAL CouRTS ON PRo HAc V!cE AoM1ss10Ns 
TO THE FEDERAL CouRTS (Subcomm. on Pro Hae Vice Admissions 1996), reprinted in 
169 F.R.D. 390, 404-08 (1997). 
56 See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 984 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1993); Richardson 
Greenshields Sec. v. Mui-Hin Lau, 825 F.2d 647, 649 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Brown v. 
Crawford County, 960 F.2d 1002, 1009 (llth Cir. 1992). 
57 See FED. R. C1v. P. 83 advisory committee's note (1985 amendment); see also 28 
u':s.c. §§ 332, 2071 notes (1994). 
58 See A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 
U. PA. L. REv. 1567, 1576 (1991); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
59 Circuit judicial councils that Congress and the Court asked to review the mea-
sures also gave them little scrutiny. See 28 U.S.C. § 332 note; FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advi-
sory committee's note (1985 amendment). 
60 Authority's accretion in district courts facilitated by proliferation, which the 
"local rulemakers, each guided by individual understandings of process" had effected, 
was dubbed the "procedural equivalent of Luther's Ninety-Five Theses." Stephen C. 
Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 631, 
672-73 n.134; see also infra notes 132-36, 142-43, 202-23 and accompanying text (an-
alyzing additional effects of proliferation). 
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b. Responses to Local Procedural Proliferation 
Congress and the federal judiciary implemented several re-
sponses to the problems which local procedural proliferation 
presented.61 The Judicial Conference supported the 1985 revisions of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 and Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 57, which mandated that districts prescribe local rules after 
providing notice, and an opportunity for comment, to the public and 
that standing orders which individual judges issue not contravene the 
Federal Rules of Civil ,or Criminal Procedure or local rules.62 The Ad-
visory Committee's notes that accompanied these amendments asked 
all of the courts to implement processes for adopting and monitoring 
standing orders, and requested that circuit judicial councils assess 
every local rule for validity and for conflicts with all of the federal 
rules and with local strictures in the remaining districts, implying that 
the councils should change local rules found to be inconsistent. 63 
Five decades after the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took 
effect, Congress adopted the JIA, important objectives of which were 
to restore the primacy of those rules and of the national rule revision 
process and to limit local proliferation.64 Senators and representa-
tives apparently intended that the legislation would revive and pro-
mote significant procedural concepts, including uniformity and 
simplicity, which animated the Advisory Committee's drafting of the 
original federal rules. 65 
Congress meant to address proliferation by regularizing and 
opening to public participation and input local processes for modify-
ing procedures. The statute required every district to appoint a local 
rules committee which would aid all of the court's judges in develop-
ing local strictures and to afford noti,ce and comment before the dis-
trict promulgated new, or revised existing, local rules.66 Moreover, 
senators and representatives expressly attempted to reduce prolifera-
tion by assigning circuit judicial councils the affirmative duty to review 
61 The Judicial Conference instituted the Local Rules Project study and upon its 
receipt issued an order asking districts to confonn local strictures to the federal rules 
and suggesting ways to treat proliferation. See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1399; Tobias, 
supra note 15, at 1597. 
62 See FED. R. Crv. P. 83; FED. R CRIM. P. 57; see also FED. R. Crv. P. 83 advisory 
committee's note (1985 amendment). The revisors did not amend analogous appel-
late or bankruptcy rules. See FED. R. APP. P. 47; FED. R. BANKR. P. 9029. 
63 See, e.g., FED. R Crv. P. 83 advisory committee's note (1985 amendment). 
64 See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 
Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d){4), 2071-2074 (1994)). 
65 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1599-1601. 
66 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994). 
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periodically all local requirements for consistency with the federal 
rules and by authorizing these entities to alter or abrogate specific 
strictures found to conflict.67 Congress seemingly intended that those 
commands would govern measures prescribed by individual judges. 68 
4. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 
Legislative enactment of the CJRA and its implementation essen-
tially discontinued effectuation of the directives in the 1988 JIA and 
Civil Rule 83's 1985 amendment that were meant to decrease local 
procedural proliferation. 69 The manner in which Congress passed 
the CJRA, the legislation's mandates, and its implementation demon-
strate apparent congressional inability to harmonize the CJRA with 
the JIA and Rule 83, a phenomenon which effectively suspended the 
provisions in the JIA and Civil Rule 83 that were aimed at proliferating 
local strictures. 
a. Statutory Passage 
In early 1990, Senator Joseph Biden, the Chair of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, introduced proposed legislation which was primarily 
based on recommendations for improving the civil justice system for-
mulated by a task force consisting of diverse participants in federal 
civil litigation.70 This bill was very controversial. A number of judges 
criticized the measure because it mandated that all ninety-four dis-
tricts institute numerous cost and delay reduction requirements, while 
others considered the proposal a legislative attempt to micro-manage 
the courts, which avoided the ordinary federal rule amendment pro-
cess or jeopardized it and the efforts of the Federal Courts Study Com-
67 See id. § 332(d) (4). The JIA thus imposed on councils an ongoing duty to 
review measures existing on its December 1, 1988 effective date and any adopted 
later, Id. § 333 note (effective date of 1988 amendment). 
68 See id. § 2071 note. Section 2071 (f) made the revision process exclusive so that 
judges would not avoid its mandates by giving local measures another label, such as a 
standing order. 
69 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1601-04. Throughout this Article, I assume that 
the CJRA also suspended the 1985 rule revisions aimed at proliferation; however, this 
is less important partly because Congress might have been unaware of the revisions. 
70 See S. 2648, lOlst Cong. (1990); see also SENATE COMM. ON THE JumcIARY, S. 
REP. 101-416, at 13-14 (1990); TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, BROOKINGS 
INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION 5-6, 12-19 
(1989) (finding much dissatisfaction with the federal civil justice system and that in-
creasing cost and delay jeopardized court access for many, while suggesting that 
courts employ reforms primarily relating to judicial case management, discovery, and 
ADR). 
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mittee (FCSC) that Congress had commissioned in the 1988 ]IA. 71 
Indeed, advocates of the CJRA seemed unaware that Co,ngress had 
adopted theJIA as recently as 1988, much less attempted to reconcile 
the statutes.72 The Judicial Conference ultimately developed a "14-
Point Program" in response to Senator Biden's meas:ure.73 After Con-
gress conducted hearings and negotiated with the Conference, Con-
gress passed an amended iteration of the proposal in November 
1990.74 
The CJRA was controversial when enacted, and it remains contro-
versial today. Certain observers ask whether the federal courts have 
encountered serious delay. Two significant 1990 studies ascertained 
that there was less delay, particularly in the sense of time to disposi-
tion, than some critics suggested. 75 Others argue that the statute fails 
to address important sources of expense and delay, such as the crimi-
nal justice system.76 The CJRA's specific goal also was the facilitation 
of experimentation with local techniques for decreasing cost and de-
lay in civil lawsuits, to the almost total exclusion of additional signifi-
cant process values and procedural precepts, especially· uniformity. 77 
The legislation concomitantly included impractical objectives and 
time-frames, as well as prescribed instrumentalities that lacked exper-
tise or assigned them ·unclear duties, while much of the statute 
71 See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 
Stat. 4642, 4644 (authorizing FCSC); JumcIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE CIVIL 
JUSTICE REFORM Acr OF 1990 FINAL REPORT: ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR REoucnoN 
OF COST AND DELAY AssESSMENT OF PRINCIPLES, GUIDELINES & TECHNIQUES (1997), re-
printed in 175 F.R.D. 62, 78 (1997) [hereinafter JCR]; see also S. REP. 101-416, supra 
note 70, at 4-:6, 10, 30-31. 
72 There is little mention of the JIA in the CJRA's legislative history. 
73 See S. REP. 101-416, supra note 70, at 4-:6, 30-31; Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of 
Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OHIO ST.J. ON DISP. REsoL. 115, 128 (1991). Opposition 
was ironic as the CJRA increased judges' discretion and power to adopt conflicting 
local measures. 
74 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994); see also S. REP. 101-416, supra note 70, at 3-6. 
75 See WoLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITI· 
CAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 157 (1990); TERENCE DUNGWORTH & 
NICHOLAS M. PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATIPN IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 74-:75 (1990). 
76 See, e.g., JCR, supra note 71, at 88-89; Avem Cohn, A Judge's View of Congres-
sional Action Affecting the Courts, LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Summer 1991, at 100; Linda 
S. Mullenix, Tlze Counter-Refonnation inProcedural]ustice, 77 MINN. L. REv. 375, 400-01 
(1992). 
77 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1463, 1466-71 
(1987) (discussing process values); infra notes 79, 82 and accompanying text. But cf. 
28 U.S.C. § 471 (stating that CJRA's purpose was opening court access, a critical pro-
cess value). 
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clashed with, and its effectuation essentially discontinued implemen-
tation of, the mandates included in the 1988JIA and the 1985 revision 
of Rule 83 which were meant to limit local proliferation.78 
b. Statutory Requirements and Implementation 
The CJRA required by December 1993 that each of the ninety-
four federal district courts issue a civil justice cost and delay reduction 
plan, which was "to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on 
the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and 
ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes."79 
The districts were to promulgate the plans after examining reports 
and suggestions assembled by advisory groups,80 institutions that the 
courts appointed ninety days subsequent to statutory enactment and 
that were to have balanced composition. 81 The districts evaluated the 
groups' reports and recommendations and considered the inclusion 
of eleven legislatively-prescribed principles, guidelines, and tech-
niques and any additional measures which they thought might reduce 
delay and expense.82 The statute's proponents, therefore, contem-
plated that reform "from the bottom up" would foster innovation 
while improving communication and promoting consensus among 
federal court users and within and across federal districts. 83 
The CJRA fostered considerable local proliferation, particularly 
of inconsistent procedures. More specifically, the statute's twelfth 
open-textured prescription implicitly encouraged districts and judges 
to promulgate and enforce local requirements that conflicted with the 
federal rules,_ United States Code provisions, and other courts' mea-
78 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317 § 608, llO 
Stat. 3847, 3860 (extending deadlines);Judicial Amendments Act ofl994, Pub. L. No. 
103-420 § 4, 108 Stat. 4343, 4345 (same); Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil justice Re-
fonn Act of 1990, 30 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. ll5, 123-33 (1993) (assigning unclear duties). 
79 28 U.S.C. § 471 & notes; see also Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil justice Refonn 
Act of 1990: Requiescat in Pace, 173 F.R.D. 565, 567-81 (1997). 
80 See 28 U.S.C. § 472. 
81 Groups were to assess "civil and criminal dockets" and identify "trends in case 
filings and in the demands being placed on courts' resources" and cost and delay's 
major causes while suggesting means to treat the districts', parties', and counsel's 
needs and to insure that each helped reduce cost and delay. See id. §§ 472, 478. 
These entities and duties show how Congress structured the CJRA in ways which could 
increase proliferation because, for example, the Act may have led to group sugges-
tions that seemed more solicitous of local judges and attorneys than of consistency. 
82 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 472-473. 
83 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1604. 
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sures.84 Numerous districts seemingly depended on this provision to 
adopt and apply strictures that contravened exogenous commands, 
and a number of courts apparently relied on the eleven prescriptions, 
especially those governing discovery, to implement inconsistent local 
mandates.85 Little in the Act or its attendant legislative history 
seemed to prohibit these conflicts. 86 All of the federal districts in-
voked the twelve statutorily-enumerated principles, guidelines, and 
techniques to effectuate diverse procedural permutations. 
Numerous judges inconsistently construed the new local mea-
sures, and a few did not even apply some requirements· that their dis-
tricts had prescribed. Moreover, many attorneys and parties 
experienced problems discovering, comprehending, and satisfying 
the relevant procedures. A significant reason for this is that strictures 
might have been included in plans, local rules, individualjudge proce-
dures, orders, or informal practices, certain of which were practically 
accessible only to local counsel and litigants. For instance, some dis-
tricts did not reduce to writing applicable automatic disclosure mea-
sures, leaving resolution to local practices or understandings. 87 The 
CJRA as enacted, drafted, and implemented, thus, clearly facilitated 
the promulgation of local measures, especially conflicting require-
ments, while suspending effectuation of those features of the 1988JIA 
which were intended to limit proliferation. 
Congress entrusted virtually every feature of CJRA implementa-
tion to the essentially unreviewable, and thus effectively complete dis-
cretion of the districts. 88 The courts possessed and exercised nearly 
84 In adopting plans, courts were to examine and could include other features 
that they deemed appropriate after considering groups' suggestions. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 473(b) (6). 
85 See U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THEE. DISTRICT OF TEX., CIVILJusrrcE EXPENSE 
AND DELAY REDUGrION PLAN 9 (1991) (declaring that plan "has precedence and is 
controlling" over conflicting federal rules); see also Tobias, supra note 19, at 1417, 
1421 (examples of reliance on last proviso); id. at 1416 (providing examples of reli-
ance on eleven prescriptions). 
86 See Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 
DuKE LJ. 929, 963 (1996); A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Management: The 
Challenge of the Civil]usticeR.efonnAct of 1990, 67 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 877, 888-92 (1993); 
Lauren K Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil justice R.efonn Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. 
REv. 1447, 1464-72 (1994). 
87 See.Tobias, supra note 15, at 1621. In fairness, the CJRA had many positive 
features. Congress structured the Act in ways which should have limited non-uniform-
ity, cost, and delay, while many districts applied measures that saved expense or time. 
A few difficulties may have resulted more from courts' interpretation and implemen-
tation than CJRA phrasing. See id. 
88 This discretion was essentially unreviewable because the Act did not prescribe 
judicial review and few cases challenged conflicting measures. See, e.g., Ashland 
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absolute discretion to promulgate local strictures covering practically 
any procedural area, even those already governed by the federal rules 
or acts of Congress, and to enforce those requirements.89 Because the 
CJRA specifically encouraged local experimentation, and a number of 
courts seemed to consider some of the statute's eleven prescriptions 
and the twelfth open-ended provision as impliedly inviting the pro-
mulgation of conflicting strictures, the legislation fostered local 
proliferation. 90 
The CJRA and its implementation, therefore, essentially discon-
tinued effectuation of those aspects of the 1988 JIA and the 1985 revi-
sion of Rule 83, which Congress and the Court meant to limit the 
proliferation of local procedures. Even the measures that attained the 
CJRA's objective of reducing cost apparently did so at the expense of 
uniformity and simplicity or of significant process values, such as fair-
ness or court access.91 Indeed, the legislation, by empowering district 
courts to create as well as apply relevant strictures, increased their au-
thority to prescribe inconsistent requirements. 
The 1990 CJRA's purpose of decreasing cost and delay by pro-
moting local testing with innovative measures inevitably multiplied the 
number of local procedures, certain of which were conflicting, and 
threatened the attainment of the goals included in the 1988 JIA and 
Rule 83's 1985 amendment which were to restrict the growing quan-
tity of mechanisms, particularly inconsistent ones. The objectives of 
saving expense and time hark back to the 1938 procedural precepts of 
prompt, economical dispute resolution, which the 1983 federal rules 
amendments were intended to revitalize, while the cost and delay that 
the 1990 CJRA was meant to limit may have resulted from the 1938 
rules' uniform, simple regime that the 1988 JIA was meant to revive. 
The 1990 enactment also might evince Congress's inability to per-
ceive process very broadly or systemically. For example, the statute's 
passage evidenced concern about saving money and time in civil litiga-
tion, although the few procedures prescribed, and the increased bal-
Chem., Inc. v. Barco, Inc., 123 F.3d 261, 263-68 (5th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff challenged 
a local rule as conflicting with a federal rule); Laird v. Chisholm, 85 F.3d 637, 637 
(9th Cir. 1996); see also supra notes 57-59, 86 and accompanying text. The CJRA, 
thus, increased local power by limiting appellate review. 
89 The CJRA may only extend developments that local proliferation had already 
begun, especially if the Act sunsets. See supra notes 33-34, 48-60 and accompanying 
text. 
90 CJRA circuit review committees' constitution and guidance made them reluc-
tant to analyze CJRA measures. See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1406-13; see also Tobias, 
supra note 15, at 1620-21 (reviewing circuit councils' reluctance to review measures 
which CJRA seemingly authorized). 
91 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1423-27; Tobias, supra note 15, at 1623-27. 
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kanization produced, may have imposed greater expense and delay. 
The CJRA essentially discontinued initiatives that were meant to de-
crease the number of local measures, especially conflicting require-
ments, which Congress had instituted a mere two years previously, and 
seemingly increased proliferation and inconsistency. 92 
5. The 1993 Federal Rules Amendments 
The most ambitious package of amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in their six-decade history took effect on December 
l, 1993.93 Some of these revisions, especially together with prior pro-
cedural developments, such as those implicating the 1983 federal 
rules changes and civil justice reform, have apparently contributed to 
the growth of local strictures, particularly inconsistent measures. This 
Subsection focuses on the modification in Federal Rule 26, which in-
stituted automatic disclosure because it was quite controversial and 
has the greatest importance to local proliferation. 
a. Automatic Disclosure 
The revision in Rule 26(a) prescribing automatic disclosure, 
which commands litigants to exchange significant information about 
their cases before traditional discovery, was the most controversial for-
mal proposal ever made to amend the federal rules.94 Practically all 
elements of the bar opposed the initial recommendation that the Ad-
visory Committee proffered because attorneys had difficulty detecting 
exactly what must be revealed, thought that disclosure would add an-
other layer of discovery, believed that the draft would pose ethical 
conflicts with clients, and were concerned that the mechanism sug-
gested could impose expense and delay.95 The Advisory Committee 
addressed this criticism by withdrawing the original proposal during 
February 1992; however, the Committee revitalized the modified dis-
92 Professor Yeazell may have best summarized the statute by stating that "without 
a more comprehensive sense of how process works, we can look forward only to blind 
vacillation between the points of a swinging pendulum as we grasp at various 're-
forms,' each bringing its own unappreciated second-order effects." Yeazell, supra 
note 60, at 677-78. 
93 Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure,· reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401 
(1993). 
94 See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discover)'-The Rush to Reform, 27 
GA. L. REv. 1, 3 (1992); Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 
F.R.D. 139, 140 (1993); Ralph K. Winter, Jn Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. 
REv. 263, 265-71 (1992) (describing objections to the proposed change). 
95 See Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. at 512 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); Bell et al., supra note 94, at 28-32; Tobias, supra note 94, at 141. 
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closure requirements in April, and the remaining entities in the rule-
revision hierarchy approved them.96 The United States House of Rep-
resentatives agreed to omit automatic disclosure from the package of 
amendments, but the Senate unexpectedly failed to act, and the dis-
closure revision took effect on December I, 1993.97 
The feature of the disclosure provision that is most relevant to 
proliferation was the inclusion of a local option measure, which em-
powered each of the ninety-four districts to alter the federal rule 
amendment or to eschew it totally.98 A number of courts relied on 
this procedure ·to adopt local disclosure techniques that departed 
from the federal rule revision or to reject it completely.99 A few dis-
tricts actually entrusted the determination regarding disclosure to the 
discretion of individual judges of the court. 100 Nearly half of the dis-
tricts eventually decided against employing the federal rule change.10 I 
This amendment concomitantly allowed judges and parties to modify 
its strictures in specific cases. I 02 
The local option procedure was quite significant. Most impor-
tant, _the provision authorized districts and individual judges to pro-
mulgate and enforce local requirements that contravened the 
governing federal rules and strictures in the other ninety-three dis-
tricts.103 The local option technique, therefore, specifically condoned 
local procedural proliferation and greatly increased the potential for 
conflicts, complicating and imposing expense, and delay in federal 
civil litigation because, for example, the applicable measures were dif-
ficult to locate, understand, and satisfy. 104 
The enormous symbolic significance of the local option mecha-
nism may well have surpassed its great pragmatic importance. Many 
96 See Paul D. Carrington, Leaming.from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real 
Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 300 (1994); Tobias, supra note 15, at 1612. 
97 See H.R. 2814, 103d Cong. 1 (1993); 139 CoNG. REc. H8746-47 (1993). 
98 See Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. at 431. 
99 See, e.g., E.D. LA. R. 606E; D. ME. R. 18(g); see also DONNA STIENSTRA, IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF DISCLOSURE IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (FJC 1994); Cavanagh, supra note 
79, at 594-95. 
100 See, e.g., N.D. ILL. R. 2.04D; U.S. DISTRICT CouRT FOR THE N. DISTRICT OF TEX., 
CIVIL JusTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2-4 (1993); see also John Flynn 
Rooney, Discovery Rule Lack!, Uniformity, Is "Source of Confusion": Critics, CHI. DAILY L. 
BuLL., Apr. 23, 1994, at 17. 
101 See Half of Districts Opt Out of New Civil Rules, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 28, 1994, at 5; see 
also STIENSTRA, supra note 99; Rooney, supra note 100. 
102 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (l); Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 
F.R.D. at 432. 
103 See generally Robel, supra note 86; Tobias, supra notes 15, 19. 
104 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1589. 
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federal courts experts have long viewed the Advisory Committee as the 
· "Defender of the Faith" in the national, consistent procedural regime 
which the 1938 Rules instituted.105 When that entity, seemingly for 
purposes of political expediency or to revive its diminishing influence, 
acceded to an approach which facilitated the prescription of conflict-
ing strictures that govern a significant constituent of the increasingly 
emphasized pretrial process, thereby exacerbating local proliferation, 
the Committee dealt a serious symbolic, and perhaps fatal, blow to the 
cause of a national, ·uniform procedural code.106 
b. Rules 30, 33, and 16 
The 1993 amendments that imposed presumptive numerical limi-
tations on interrogatories and depositions are also relevant to prolifer-
ation.107 The provisions, which allow local variation and permit 
judges and litigants to modify the procedures in specific cases, resem-
ble and have effects similar to the federal automatic disclosure amend-
ment.108 For example, the requirements governing presumptive 
limits on depositions and interrogatories have led certain districts to 
opt-out of or to alter the federal rules, thus eroding uniformity and 
simplicity, and imposing expense and delay.109 A few revisions in Rule 
16(b) covering pretrial conferences, which permit local option in 
some situations and change of time strictures in particular suits might 
105 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Inf annal Discovery and 
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 855-56 (1991) (explaining that the 
Advisory Committee is slow to accept changes in the rules, but is losing influence); 
Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, 
LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBS., Summer 1988, at 67 (arguing that the way changes are made 
to the Rules is not good enough an~ proposing field experiments for proposed 
changes before they are made); Yeazell, supra note 60, at 672-76. 
106 I am indebted to Lauren Robel for this idea. But see Carrington, supra note 96, 
at 300; but see als-o Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(l), (b), ( d), 
(f), 30(d)(2), 192 F.R.D. 340, 382, 390-91, 393-94 (200,0) (eliminating most of the 
local option provisions). 
107 See FED. R.. Crv. P. 30(a) (2) (A), 33(a). · 
108 Presumptive limits raise issues analogous to automatic disclosure. Most impor-
tant is provision in specific cases for judicial modification and litigant stipulation. 
109 See, e.g., D. MoNT. R. 200-5(c); N.D.N.Y. GEN. ORDER No. 40 (Dec. 14, 1993). 
But cf. Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 390 
(1993) (eliminating the local option provisions for limitations on depositions and 
interrogatories but retaining it for Rule 36 requests for admission and retaining the 
provision for judicial modification and party stipulation in specific cases). 
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have similarly decreased uniformity, simplicity, and trans-substantivity, 
and increased costs.110 
The set of proposals in the preliminary draft which the Advisory 
Committee prepared in August 1991 included additional procedures 
that require rather brief examination because they implicate issues 
which are less applicable, but relevant, to proliferation. The rule re-
visors deleted or withdrew a few proposals during the course of the 
amendment process, while others were constituents of the 1993 modi-
fications. The most important suggestion that did not become effec-
tive was a revision in Rule 83, which would have provided for local 
procedural experimentation. The proposal empowered districts with 
Judicial Conference approval to prescribe, for not more than five 
years, experimental local rules that contravened federal rules. rn The 
Advisory Committee apparently retracted the recommendation out of 
deference to contemporaneous CJRA testing, thus losing a valuable 
technique, which carefully balanced the need to experiment with po-
tentially efficacious measures and to treat peculiar, problematic local 
conditions against inconsistency's complications.11 2 
6. The 1995 Amendments of the Federal Rules 
During 1995, the national rule revision entities responded to cer-
tain concerns about proliferation by amending the federal civil, appel-
late, bankruptcy, and criminal rules, which govern the prescription of 
local procedures in the respective areas. 113 These changes incorpo-
rate the JIA mandate that local rules not conflict with federal rules or 
United States Code provisions and also proscribe duplication. 114 The 
modifications correspondingly require courts to conform the number-
ing of local rules to any uniform system which the Judicial Conference 
llO See Amendments to Fed. Rul.es of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. at 427-28; see also id. at 
478-79 (Rule 54(d) (2) (B), (D) revisions prescribe local option); D. Mn. R. 104.1; 
S.D. IND. R. 26.3. 
111 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 83 (1991), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY 
DRAFT]. 
ll2 Compare id., with JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Table of Contents (1992) [hereinafter PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS] (deleting proposal); see also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG 
RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 59 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. 
ll3 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (1995 amendment), reprinted in 150 F.R.D. 400 
(1993); see also MooRE's 3d, supra note 54, § 83.02 (estimating 6000 local civil rules in 
1995). I rely in this subsection on Civil Rule 83 which typifies the other, similarly-
phrased revisions. 
ll4 See FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (1995 amendment); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (a) (1994). 
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prescribes, because consistent schemes will facilitate the efforts of an 
increasingly nationalized bar and of parties to find and comply with 
local measures.115 Moreover, the revisions prohibit judges from en-
forcing local rules that impose technical requirements in ways that 
forfeit litigants' rights for nonwillful failures to conform.116 
The 1995 amendments recognize that appellate courts and dis-
trict and bankruptcy judges invoke multiple directives apart from the 
federal rules and local rules to regulate practice and authorize the 
mandates' continued use.1~7 However, these commands cannot con-
flict with or repeat the federal rules, acts of Congress, or the local 
rules.118 Moreover, judges can only impose sanctions or other disad-
vantages for noncompliance with the local procedures when alleged 
violators have actual notice of the strictures in specific cases,119 notice 
which may 'be satisfied, for example, by "furnishing litigants with a 
copy outlining the judge's practices."120 Each Advisory Committee's 
note admonishes that these local directives can be problematic be-
cause their "sheer volume may impose an unreasonable barrier" to 
attorneys and parties who may be unaware of, or experience difficul-
ties securing, the strictures.12 1 
Most of the requirements included in the 1995 amendments of 
the federal rules have apparently received limited implementation to 
date.122 The principal reason why so few appellate and district courts 
and individual judges have effectuated the revisions seems to be reluc-
tance or uncertainty attributable to contemporaneous experimenta-
tion under the CJRA. Moreover, the Judicial Conference has not yet 
seemingly surveyed, or enforced compliance with, its 1996 directive 
prescribing a uniform numerical system to which it requested that dis-
tricts conform their local rules by April 1997, although the Confer-
115 See FED. R Crv. P. 83 (1995 amendment); see also id. advisory committee's note; 
infra notes 123, 134, 248 and accompanying text. 
116 See FED. R Crv. P. 83 (1995 amendment); see also id. advisory committee's note. 
117 See id.; see also id. advisory committee's note. 
118 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §207l(a). 
119 See FED. R Crv. P. 83 (1995 amendment); see also id. advisory committee's note. 
120 Id. advisory committee's note. 
121 Id. The Judicial Conference reinforced the revisions by urging reduction of 
the "number of local rules and standing orders" and that circuit councils and the 
Conference "discourage further 'balkanization' of federal practice by exercising their 
statutory authority to review local court rules." LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 112, at 
59. 
122 I rely in this paragraph on conversations with many individuals who are famil-
iar with implementation of the 1995 amendments. 
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ence rather expeditiously provided for the regime and many districts 
have apparently complied.123 
In short, the above procedural developments, particularly some 
quite recent ones, such as the 1993 amendments in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and civil justice reform, as they elaborate signifi-
cant prior developments, illustrate numerous concepts that involve lo-
cal proliferation. Most important, they suggest that certain 1993 
revisions and the CJRA's implementation essentially suspended the ef-
fectuation of mandates in several federal rules and in the 1988 JIA 
which were meant to reduce proliferation, thereby permitting the fur-
ther fragmentation of federal civil procedure. 
E. A Survey of Local Procedures Other Than District Court 
Civil Procedures 
Many of the above propositions regarding local civil procedures 
apparently have similar application to additional local requirements, 
although the relevant developments, the precise time when they oc-
curred, and the scope and pace of the strictures' proliferation may 
differ somewhat. Most pertinent, local measures which govern appel-
late, bankruptcy, criminal, and admiralty cases have seemingly in-
creased in numbers and inconsistency, while the history of their 
growth resembles that for civil procedures. Thorough assessment of 
all these provisions would be a mammoth undertaking which exceeds 
the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, the importance for local prac-
tice of the requirements and of attempting to inform future efforts 
which address proliferation means that these strictures deserve exami-
nation below. 
1. Appellate Procedures 
Proliferating local measures in the United States Courts of Ap-
peals require comparatively limited evaluation, even though they have 
proved particularly problematic, because Professor Gregory Sisk re-
cently completed a comprehensive analysis of the procedures and the 
difficulties which they present.124 The Supreme Court promulgated 
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) in December 1967, 
123 See JAMES s. KAKALIK, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE CJRA IN PILOT AND COMPARISION DISTRICTS 34-35 (1996); see also supra note 116 
and accompanying text; infra note 248 and accompanying text. 
124 Gregory C. Sisk, The Balllanization of Appellate Justice: The Proliferation of Local 
Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1, 1-61 (1997). 
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and they became effective on July l, 1968.125 The Court only adopted 
the FRAP three decades after it had prescribed the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure; however, most of the major precepts, such as uni-
formity, simplicity, and inexpensive, prompt dispute disposition, un-
derlying the civil rules also supported the FRAP. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court incorporated in the original FRAP 47, which is analo-
gous to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83, thereby authorizing the 
appellate courts to issue and apply local measures which comported 
with the FRAP.126 
These federal rules seemed to operate rather efficaciously during 
the years immediately following their adoption. However, the appel-
late courts apparently relied on FRAP 47 or other authority to pre-
scribe increasing numbers of local strictures that govern appeals, 
many of which contravened the FRAP, relatively sq on after the provi-
sions' 1968 effective date. Two decades later, the JIA specifically pro-
hibited appellate courts from prescribing inconsistent local rules and 
mandated periodic Judicial Conference review of local strictures and 
the abolition or modification of any provisions which it deemed in 
conflict with the FRAP.127 During 1995, the national revisors adopted 
an amendment in FRAP 47, which closely resembles the 1995 modifi-
cation in Federal Civil Rule 83 but expressly instructs that "[a] gener-
ally applicable direction to a parties or a lawyer regarding practice 
before a C01Jrt must be in a local rule rather than an internal operat-
ing procedure or standing order."12s 
When Professor Sisk reviewed local appellate courts' require-
ments, he found a "remarkable disunity in rules of appellate practice 
among the federal courts of appeals, including notable instances of 
actual conflict between local practice and the FRAP."129 Perhaps most 
disturbing was his determination that resulted from assessing a "few 
central elements of the ordinary civil appeal," rather than thoroughly 
canvassing "all local circuit rules on all aspects of appellate 
practice."130 
125 Judicial Conference of the U.S., Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 43 F.R.D. 61, 61 (1968); Sisk, supra note 124, at 5 
n.19. 
126 See FED. R. APP. P. 47; see also supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text. 
127 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 2071 (c)(2) (1994). 
128 FED. R. APP. P. 47 (1995 amendment); see also id. advisory committee's note 
("[A] local rule may not bar any practice that [the FRAP] explicitly or implicitly per-
mit."); supra notes 59, 108-09 and accompanying text (indicating Federal Civil Rule 
83's 1995 revision and FRAP 47 was not revised in 1985). 
129 Sisk, supra note 124, at 7. 
130 Id. at 8. 
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However, the diversity and complexity of local rules is more pro-
nounced with respect to other special appellate matters, ranging from 
applications for a stay or a writ of mandamus at the outset of the ap-
pellate process to petitions for rehearing and applications for attor-
ney's fees at the conclusion of an appeal.13 1 
Professor Sisk ascertained that the proliferation of inconsistent 
and duplicative local appellate requirements has numerous detrimen-
tal impacts.132 He asserted that local variations on, and supplementa-
tion of, the FRAP hinder efficient and cost-effective pursuit of appeals 
and deny justice in specific cases.133 Professor Sisk also claimed that 
the expanding number and complexity of local commands hamper 
thorough understanding and increase the possibilities for innocent 
error, while the ne.ed to find, comprehend, and comply with the stric-
tures requires inordinate, unnecessary expenditures of resources. 134 
He correspondingly observed that proliferation multiplies the oppor-
tunities for construction and application of procedural requirements 
and for concomitant mistakes by judges and court staff.135 Indeed, 
Professor Sisk concluded that the "radiation of inconsistent circuit 
rules poses a direct challenge to the fundamental concept of a federal 
procedure."136 
2. Bankruptcy Procedures 
Local bankruptcy measures have similarly proliferated. However, 
they warrant relatively brief consideration here because Professor 
Mary Josephine Newborn Wiggins recently finished a thorough exami-
nation of the local strictures when serving as the reporter for the 
Committee for the Review of Local Bankruptcy Rules, which the 
Ninth CircuitJudicial Council appointed.137 Prior to 1973, the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and a series of general orders covered 
procedure in the bankruptcy courts, but that year the Supreme Court 
promulgated the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (FRBP) .138 
131 See id. 
132 See id. at 5-6, 25-34. 
133 See id. at 6, 26-30. 
134 See id. at 6, 30-33; see al5o Tobias, supra note 19, at 1422. 
135 See Sisk, supra note 124, at 33-34; see al5o John B. Oakley, An open Letter on 
Refonning the Process of Revising the Federal Rules, 55 MoNT. L. REv. 435, 445 (1994). 
136 Sisk, supra note 124, at 6 (emphasis in original). 
137 Mary Josephine Newborn Wiggins, Globalism, Parochialism and Procedure: A Criti-
cal Assessment of Local Rulemaking in Bankruptcy Court, 46 S.C. L. REv. 1245, 1245-48 
(1995). 
138 See id. at 1249. See generally HAROLD REMINGTON, TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY 
LAws OF THE UNITED STATES 457-615 (6th ed. 1955). 
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Since the 1970s, bankruptcy judges have relied on FRBP 9029, which 
is the analogue of Federal Civil Rule 83, or other powers to adopt and 
apply expanding numbers of local requirements, many of which con-
travene or duplicate the FBRP or statutes.139 The:: 1995 revision of 
FRBP 9029, therefore, imposed mandates proscribing these local pro-
visions, commands that are virtually identical to those in Civil Rule 
83.140 
The bankruptcy judges have apparently promulgated and en-
forced numerous inconsistent and redundant local measures. Profes-
sor Wiggins' "survey of local bankruptcy rules in the Ninth Circuit 
reveal[ed] some conflict with the federal bankruptcy rules and the 
Bankruptcy Code [and that] many districts have created local bank-
ruptcy rules that merely repeat existing federal law."141 She found 
that "inconsistencies can lead to the misapplication of federal law 
[meaning that parties] receive different treatment in different dis-
tricts [and] impose unreasonable barriers to access for some liti-
gants."142 Professor Wiggins correspondingly observed that 
repetitious local "rules impair the efficient operation of the bank-
ruptcy courts" by wasting judicial and administrative resources on 
drafting and distribution of the strictures as well as attorneys' and liti-
gants' money and time on discovering, comprehending, and satisfying 
the measures.143 ' 
This proliferation is particularly important because bankruptcy 
filings comprise the fastest growing category of lawsuits on the federal 
district court docket.144 Finding, understanding, and conforming to 
more local bankruptcy provisions, some of which are inconsistent or 
redundant, and the need to use local counsel who are familiar with 
local practice can consume resources.145 Local bankruptcy require-
ments have also imposed an additional layer of procedural obstacles, 
prompting appeals that challenge bankruptcy judges' authority to 
139 Rule 927 was the predecessor of FRBP 9029. See Wiggins, supra note 137, at 
1250. 
140 See FED. R BANKR. P. 9029 (authorizing bankruptcy judges to adopt local mea-
sures other than local rules but to adopt local rules only when district courts delegate 
power). 
141 Wiggins, supra note 137, at 1~51, 1255. 
142 Id. at 1254-56. 
143 See id. at 1256; see also id .. at 1255 (characterizing large number of repetitive 
local rules as "primary threat to efficiency of bankruptcy courts"). 
144 SeeAnMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTS, FEDERAL COURTS CAsELOAD CONTINUES 
UPWARD SPIRAL (1997) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review) [hereinafter UP-
WARD SPIRAL]. 
145 See Letter from Mary Jo Wiggins, Professor of Law, University of San Diego, to 
Carl Tobias (Mar. 18, 1997) (on file with author). 
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adopt local strictures and additional disputes, while the measures 
might have restricted court access for certain parties, such as those 
with limited financial or political power.146 These considerations, 
which have apparently hindered litigation's economical and speedy 
resolution, are critical in bankruptcy because the factors can deplete 
the assets that are available to creditors by, for instance, committing to 
case processing resources which they might othenvise recover. 147 
II. AN ANALYSIS OF EFFORTS To LIMIT LOCAL 
PROCEDURAL PROLIFERATION 
The description of local procedural proliferation's history in Part 
I of this Article suggests that the mandates relating to review of those 
provisions in the respective federal rules which govern the adoption of 
local requirements and in the JIA have received very little implemen-
tation. I initially examine this effectuation, emphasizing civil proce-
dures. This Part then explores the explanations for, and the 
implications of, truncated implementation. I conclude 'vith lessons to 
be derived from this experience. 
A. Implementation of Local Procedural Review 
1. Civil Procedures 
The duties regarding periodic local review of civil procedures for 
consistency and duplication and possible abrogation or alteration 
which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83. and the 1988 JIA imposed 
on circuit judicial councils, the ninety-four federal district courts, and 
individual judges have received circumscribed effectuation. I focus on 
the councils' efforts because those entities have greater responsibility 
146 See id. 
147 The historical dearth oflocal criminal procedures has made their proliferation 
less problematic. The District of Kansas with thirty-eight civil, but only seven crimi-
nal, rules is illustrative. See FEDERAL LoCAL CouRT RuLEs (2d ed. West Group 1997). 
However, developments, such as Congress's expansion of criminal jurisdiction and 
criminal cases' increasing complexity, mean that districts and judges have adopted 
more conflicting local measures, and this will increase. See Heiser, supra note 1, at 
575-76; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 57; 1 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE§§ 1-4, at 901-902 (2d ed. 1982). Proliferation has been even Jess troub-
ling in admiralty. Few districts and judges, primarily on the coasts, have adopted pro-
cedures which contravene the federal admiralty or civil rules. See Heiser, supra note 
1, at 575-76; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 81 (a) (listing other cases in which federal civil 
rules apply only insofar as they do not contravene procedures imposed by statute or 
otherwise); 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, §§ 3201-3256 (analyzing admiralty proce-
dure); WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 63 (discussing procedure in other non-civil cases, such 
as copyright and habeas corpus). 
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and ostensibly have considerable independence from the districts and 
judges whose strictures the councils are scrutinizing. 
a. Circuit Judicial Councils 
1. Councils That Have Conducted Review 
Several circuit judicial councils have undertaken the review of lo-
cal measures that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 and the JIA re-
quired. The circuit councils have approached this obligation in 
numerous ways, have accorded varying levels of scrutiny to local stric-
tures, and have attained differing degrees of success in terms of secur-
ing local procedural modificatjons. 
During the early 1990s, the Circuit Judicial Council for the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
performed a comprehensive review of the local measures that the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia had promul-
gated.148 The council recommended changes in a number of provi-
sions which the judges of the district court then implemented.149 
For a decade, the Fifth Circuit staff attorney's office has reviewed 
thoroughly, and prepared an analysis of, all newly-adopted local rules. 
A committee of the judicial council has then relied on that evaluation 
in deciding whether to abrogate local provisos. The council, which 
takes this responsibility very seriously, has occasionally advised district 
and bankruptcy courts to redraft local rules deemed in conflict.150 
Since 1990, the Seventh Circuit Judicial Council has retained as a con-
sultant Professor Mary Squiers, who has served for more than a dec-
ade as the Project Director of the Local Rules Project.151 Professor 
Sqq.iers annually analyzes the local requirements that the federal dis-
tricts within the council's purview prescribe and proffers suggestions 
regarding those measures to the council. The council has evaluated 
Professor Squiers's recommendations, which it generally follows, and 
has asked that the districts abolish or alter some strictures, requests 
which the courts have typically honored. 
148 See Memorandum from David Pimentel, Assistant Circuit Executive for Legal 
Affairs, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, to Local Rules Review Committee (Feb. 8, 
1995) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with David Pimentel Quly 22, 1994). 
149 See Memorandum from David Pimentel, supra note 148; Telephone Interview 
with David Pimentel, supra note 148. 
150 See Letter from David Pimentel, Deputy Circuit Executive, U.S. Courts for the 
Fifth Circuit, to Carl Tobias Quly 17, 2001) (on file with author). 
151 Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, Project Director of Local Rules P[O-
ject (Feb. 18, 1998). 
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During 1993, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council appointed a com-
mittee to scrutinize local procedures promulgated by the fifteen dis-
tricts that are situated in the Ninth Circuit.152 The burdensome 
nature of the responsibilities entailed in reviewing all of these local 
requirements frustrated this entity's efforts, and the committee sus-
pended its attempt to conclude a comprehensive assessment. In 1994, 
the judicial council delegated local procedural review to the Confer-
ence of Chief District Judges, a creation of the council, and the Con-
ference constituted a District Local Rules Review Committee (LRRC) 
under its auspices.153 The LRRC, which consisted of three chief dis-
trict court judges, one district clerk, two law professors, and a practi-
tioner, undertook scrutiny of the local measures instituted in the 
fifteen districts.154 
The LRRC secured the assistance of volunteer local reviewers, 
who were typically law faculty or attorneys, in the fifteen courts.155 
These reviewers evaluated all local rules and general orders that have 
the effect of local rules, except for local rules which courts adopted 
pursuant to the CJRA or the 1993 federal rule revisions.156 Reviewers 
compiled lists of provisions, which conflicted with, or duplicated, fed-
eral rules or acts of Congress, and reasons for their findings and for-
warded them to the LRRC.157 
The LRRC then transmitted these analyses to the judicial officers 
of each district for their assessment and response. 158 Numerous dis-
tricts, upon examining these reports, decided to abrogate or change a 
number of local strictures. All of the courts next sent replies to the 
LRRC which evaluated them and made recommendations regarding 
specific local measures to the judicial council. The LRRC suggested 
that the council eliminate or modify some provisions which the dis-
tricts retained and that the council propose to the national rule revi-
sion entities a few procedures for consideration in the amendment 
process. For example, several courts had adopted local requirements 
152 See Telephone Interview with David Pimentel, supra note 148; see also Carl To-
bias, Suggestions for Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 359, 
365 (1995). 
153 See Heiser, supra note 1, at 563; Tobias, supra note 152, at 365. 
154 See Heiser, supra note 1, at 563. Professor Margaret johns, U.C. Davis School 
of Law, served as the extremely capable chair. I was the other law professor. 
155 See id.; Carl Tobias, Continuing Federal Civil justice R.efonn in Montana, 57 MoNT. 
L. REv. 143, 147-48 (1996). 
156 See Heiser, supra note 1, at 563-64; Tobias, supra note 155, at 147-48. 
157 See Heiser, supra note 1, at 563-64; Carl Tobias, Ongoing Federal Civil Justice 
R.efonn in Montana, 57 MoNT. L. REv. 511, 515 (1996). 
158 See Carl Tobias, Contemplating the End of Federal Civil justice R.efonn in Montana, 
58 MONT. L. REv. 281, 283-84 (1997); Tobias, supra note 157, at 515. 
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which they premised on a federal statute that Congress had re-
pealed, 159 while most districts had promulgated local strictures which 
excused compliance with Federal Rule 5(d)'s command that certain 
discovery materials be filed with the courts, provisions which directly 
contravene this federal provision.160 
During early 1997, the LRRC tendered its report and recommen-
dations to the circuit judicial council.161 At a February council meet-
ing, Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr. appointed a committee comprised of 
Chief Judge Judith Keep of the Southern District of California and 
Chief Judge Edward Lodge of the District of Idaho to review the 
LRRC's submission and develop possible responses.162 In May, the 
two judges provided several suggestions for the circuit council's con-· 
sideration. First, the committee proposed that the council not abolish 
or change any local measures that the LRRC recommended be al-
tered, but rather continue working with districts and judges to en-
courage their modification of the requirements.163 Second, Judges 
Keep and Lodge suggested that the council not commission another 
local review for five years, unless Chief Judge Hug so ordered.164 The 
circuit council subscribed to the committee proposals.165 
ii. Councils That Suspended Review 
The Sixth Circuit Judicial Council commenced local procedural 
review in the early 1990s.166 The council requested that lawyers in the 
staff attorney's office of the circuit executive scrutinize the local re-
quirements'of all districts within the council's compass. The lawyers 
undertook a comprehensive examination of the local strictures for 
consistency and duplication but experienced difficulty in addressing 
disuniform procedures adopted under the CJRA. The staff attorney's 
office sought the circuit council's advice regarding this concern. Dur-
ing a May 1994 meeting of the council, it voted to discontinue moni-
159 See, e.g., D. AR!z. R. 1.17 ( d); D. OR. R. 1030-2; see also Federal Boat Safety Act, 
46 U.S.C. § 1484(d) (1994) (affording citation to repealed statute). 
160 See, e.g., D. NEV. R. 26-28; D.N.M.I.R. Civ. 26.13; see also FED. R. Crv. P. 5(d); 14 
MooRE's 3d, supra note 54, § 83.04 (stating that sixty-eight districts excuse compli-
ance but that the Advisory Committee has refused to amend Rule 5 on five occasions). 
161 DISTRICT LOCAL RuLES REVIEW CoMM., REPORT TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT JumcIA,L 
COUNCIL, Executive Summary (1997); see also Telephone Interview with Margaret 
Johns, Chair, LRRC (Dec. 15, 1997). 
162 See Telephone Interview with Margaret Johns, supra note 161. 
163 See id. 
164 See id 
165 See id 
166 See Carl Tobias, A Sixth Circuit Story, 23 FIA. ST. U. L. REv. 983, 989 (1996). 
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taring of local provisions pending the receipt of more guidance from 
Congress, the Judicial Conference, or case law as to whether the CJRA 
superseded the federal rules.161 
iii. Councils That Have Explored Local Review 
Several circuit judicial councils have apparently explored the pos-
sibility of conducting local procedural review but have not actually un-
dertaken analyses. For instance, the First and Third Circuit Judicial 
Councils have evaluated the prospect of creating a framework for as-
sessing local measures, which is analogous to that employed by the 
Ninth Circuit.168 However, neither council has formally instituted a 
review process, much less completed scrutiny of relevant procedures. 
Other circuit councils have collected local strictures which their dis-
tricts promulgated but may not have analyzed them for consistency or 
duplication. For example, the Eighth Circuit Judicial Council has 
asked that districts within its scope submit all of their local require-
ments to the circuit executive office.169 
iv. Councils That Have Apparently Conducted Minimal Review 
A number of the circuit judicial councils have seemingly per-
formed minimal meaningful evaluation of local measures. My conver-
sations with personnel in the circuit executive offices, law professors, 
and practitioners in the Second, Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits 
suggest that the councils have conducted little, if any, review. The 
Fourth Circuit is illustrative. Samuel W. Phillips, the Fourth Circuit 
Executive, stated that scrutiny of all local strictures adopted by district 
courts would be a "mammoth task" because the Fourth Circuit in-
cludes nine federal districts and the council has few resources.170 
Phillips observed that the circuit council thinks that any difficulties 
involving local provisions would "readily surface and be treated."171 
167 See Judicial Council of Sixth Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals, Minutes of Meeting 
3-4 (May 4, 1996). 
168 See Telephone InteIView with Andrew Tietz, Assistant Circuit Executive, U.S. 
Courts for the First Circuit Quly 22, 1994); see also Telephone InteIView with Theresa 
Burnett, Assistant Circuit Executive, U.S. Courts for the Third Circuit (Nov. 30, 2001); 
Telephone InteIView with Susan Kruger, Deputy Circuit Executive, U.S. Courts for the 
First Circuit (Nov. 30, 2001); Telephone InteIView with David Pimentel, supra note 
148. 
169 See Telephone InteIView with David Day, Professor of Law, University of South 
Dakota (Apr. 10, 1997). 
170 Telephone InteIView with Samuel W. Phillips, Circuit Executive, U.S. Courts 
for the Fourth Circuit Qan. 18, 1995). 
171 Id. 
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Then-Chief Judge Sam J. Ervin, III examined the practicability of as-
sessing every local measure prescribed by districts within the court for 
consistency, but he concluded that it was "not feasible for the Fourth 
Circuit to undertake such a review" without more personnel or 
money.172 
b. Districts and Individual Judges 
I am aware of some federal districts which have performed the 
review of local procedures that Federal Civil Rule 83 and the JIA man-
dated. Most of these courts simultaneously scrutinized local require-
ments and abolished or altered them in the context of implementing 
the CJRA or the 1993 federal rules amendments, while virtually no 
districts have monitored standing orders or other strictures that indi-
vidual judges issue and apply. 
Certain federal districts did review and change their local proce-
dures when effectuating the CJRA or the 1993 federal rules revisions. 
For example, courts in several multi-district states promulgated the 
same local rules, while a few courts abrogated or modified conflicting 
local measures. The efforts of the Northern and Southern Districts of 
West Virginia are illustrative.173 The courts named working groups 
that capitalized on implementation of the CJRA and the 1993 federal 
amendments to undertake the development of an identical set oflocal 
rules.174 Multiple federal districts in Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, and 
New York similarly appeared to seize on the opportunity which CJRA 
experimentation afforded by adopting the same· local rules within the 
respective states.175 Federal district judges in the District of Maryland 
and the Eastern District of Virginia have also scrutinized the courts' 
local rules and claimed that they found no conflicts with the federal 
rules or acts of Congress.176 The increased balkanization engendered 
172 Letter from Samuel W. Phillips, Circuit Executive, U.S. Courts for the Fourth 
Circuit, to Carl Tobias (Feb. 14, 1995) (on file with author). · 
173 Cf Carl Tobias, Civil justice Refonn in the Fourth Circuit, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 
89, 99-105 (1993) (discussing early CJRA implementation and local rule review in 
those districts). 
174 Telephone Interview with John W. Fisher, II, Professor of Law, West Virginia 
University Uan. 20, 1995). 
175 See, e.g., Local Rules, U.S. District Courts for the Northern & Southern Districts 
of Iowa; Local Rules, U.S. District Courts for the Eastern & Western Districts of Ken-
tud.y, Local Rules, U.S. District Courts for the Eastern, Middle & Western Districts of 
Louisiana; Local Rules, U.S. District Courts for the Eastern & Southern Districts of 
New York. 
176 See Telephone Interview with Judge Robert E. Payne, Chair, Local Rules Com-
mittee, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia Uan. 25, 1995); Tele-
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by the CJRA experience has concomitantly led the bars in several ur-
ban districts to call for limitations on proliferation, while the courts 
have instituted evaluations of local procedures in an attempt to re-
strict the measures.177 Finally, I am aware of no individual judges who 
have reviewed their own orders or practices for consistency. 
2. Local Procedures Other Than Civil Procedures 
a. Appellate Procedures 
The duties respecting periodic local review of appellate proce-
dures for conflicts and duplication, as well as potential elimination or 
alteration which the 1995 amendment of FRAP 47 and the JIA im-
posed on the Judicial Conference and the appellate courts have ap-
parently received little, if any, implementation. I emphasize 
Conference monitoring because that entity has more responsibility 
and may be better positioned to comply by virtue of its distance from 
the appellate courts whose strictures are being reviewed. 
The Judicial Conference has instituted virtually no action to effec-
tuate the mandates in FRAP 47 and the JIA, while delegating substan-
tial responsibility for compliance to the Judicial Conference 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Evidence (Standing Commit-
tee). 178 Indeed, Professor Sisk characterized the "power to modify or 
abrogate any rule prescribed by a circuit [as] little known and seldom 
invoked," finding that "on only one occasion ... has the Conference 
been requested to overturn a circuit rule."179 The attorney generals 
of five states asked the Judicial Conference to invalidate the Ninth 
Circuit's local rule covering death penalty appeals because they be-
lieved that the prescription contravened federal law.180 However, the 
Conference diplomatically intimated that there might be a conflict 
but essentially remanded the matter to the Ninth Circuit when it in-
vited the court's reconsideration of the requirement. 181 On July 1, 
1997, the Ninth Circuit responded to the Conference overture by pub-
phone Interview with Chief Judge J. Frederick Motz, Chair, Local Rules Committee, 
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (Jan. 24, 1995). 
177 See Edward D. Cavanagh, Congress' Failed Attempt To Spur Efficiency: The Legacy of 
the Civil justice Refonn Act, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 1996, at 28, 30. 
178 See Sisk, supra note 124, at 51-52. 
179 Id. at 51. 
180 Id.; see also McCabe, supra note 2, at 1690 n.182. 
181 See Sisk, supra note 124, at 52; see also Carrington, supra note 86, at 978. 
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lishing a draft provision for death penalty appeals as an interim proce-
dure which was immediately effective.182 
I found very little evidence that the appellate courts had under-
taken efforts to discharge the obligations which the 1995 revision of 
FRAP 47 or the JIA imposed. My conversations with officers in the 
circuit executive offices, practitioners, and law professors in the re-
gions where the courts are located suggest that no appellate court has 
voluntarily scrutinized local strictures for consisteng, much less abol-
ished or amended any requirements deemed to conflict.183 In fair-
ness, it may be unrealistic to expect that the appellate courts would 
have rigorously implemented the command in FRAP 47 because this 
mandate only took effect in December 1995 and because the revisors 
did not amend the rule in 1985, while virtually all appellate courts 
have uniformly numbered their local rules.18 4 
b. Bankruptcy Procedures 
The mandates relating to periodic local review of bankruptcy pro-
cedures for consistency and duplication and possible elimination or 
change which FRBP 9029 imposed on circuit councils, federal courts, 
and individual judges have received considerably less effectuation 
than those governing civil procedures. Indeed, my discussions with 
staff in the circuit executive offices, practicing attorneys, and law 
faculty in the areas where the courts are located indicate that virtually 
no courts or judges have discharged this duty.18 5 
The Ninth Circuit Judicial Council has conducted the most ambi-
tious review of bankruptcy requirements. During 1993, the judicial 
council appointed a Committee for the Review of Local Bankruptcy 
Rules (CRLBR) to scrutinize procedures adopted by the circuit's fif-
teen districts.186 The CRLBR fully evaluated the procedures pre-
scribed throughout the court and completed a comprehensive report 
in 1994.187 Professor Wiggins of the University of San Diego School of 
182 See 9TH CIR. R. 22-1 to -6; see also Sisk, supra note 124, at 52 n.240. It became 
final in 1998. 
183 Notes of conversations are on file with author. 
184 See supra notes 62-63, 122 and accompanying text; infra note 249 and accom-
panying text. 
185 Notes of conversations are on file with author. 
186 See NINTH CIRCUIT JumcIAL CouNCIL, REvIEw AND ANALYSIS OF LoCAL BANK-
RUPTCY RULES OF PROCEDURE (1994) [hereinafter REvlEW AND ANALYSIS]; see also Wig-
gins, supra note 137. Because the CRLBR and the LRRC operated similarly, I 
emphasize the CRLBR's aspects which were different. See supra notes 152-61 and 
accompanying text. 
187 See REvIEw AND ANALYSIS, supra note 186. 
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Law, the entity's reporter, undertook the daunting task of collecting, 
analyzing, and synthesizing all of the relevant bankruptcy require-
ments with some assistance from the committee members and from 
law students at her institution.188 The CRLBR then designated stric-
tures that it believed were conflicting or duplicative and circulated the 
entity's findings to judges in the fifteen districts. The committee ap-
parently attained the greatest success in "identifying inconsistent rules 
and persuading most districts to voluntarily rescind most inconsistent 
rules."189 
The CRLBR next suggested that the Ninth Circuit Judicial Coun-
cil abrogate or modify local requirements that the committee found 
to conflict with, or repeat, federal strictures but which districts refused 
to alter. 190 Because some courts resisted the CBLBR's overtures, and 
the circuit council was not particularly assertive about invalidating cer-
tain inconsistent rules, a number of conflicting and redundant local 
provisions remain in place.191 
B. Reasons for Limited Implementation of Local Procedural Review 
Numerous reasons apparently explain the growth of local proce-
dural strictures, increasing numbers of which conflict with, or dupli-
cate, federal rules or United States Code provisions, as well as the 
inability or reluctance of the Judicial Conference, circuit judicial 
councils, federal appeals courts, districts, and individual judges to im-
plement comprehensively the commands regarding proliferation that 
various federal rules and the JIA imposed. Most of these ideas apply 
to all of the local measures, monitoring entities, and review mandates. 
188 See REVIEW AND ANALYSIS, supra note 186; see also Letter from Mary Jo Wiggins, 
supra note 145. 
189 Letter from Mary Jo Wiggins, supra note 145. 
190 See id. 
191 Local criminal and admiralty strictures have received little review. My inquiries 
of circuit executive personnel, lawyers, and law professors suggest that very few dis-
tricts or judges have monitored. Several councils which reviewed civil, also evaluated 
criminal, strictures. The District of Columbia's analysis included criminal measures, 
as has the Seventh Circuit's annual review. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying 
text. The LRRC included local criminal strictures in its work, while a few of its dis-
tricts changed some conflicting measures. See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying 
text. The LRRC may have accorded admiralty procedures their only serious oversight 
by analyzing, and making suggestions as to, all local admiralty strictures which many 
districts had adopted, and a few courts modified certain measures. 
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1. Reasons for Proliferation 
All of the analysis above suggests that there are many explana-
tions why the number of local procedures, some of which were incon-
sistent or repetitive, has steadily expanded since the 1970s. Numerous 
members of the Conference, circuit councils, and appellate and dis-
trict courts may have found the prohibitions on these local require-
ments in the respective federal rules and the ]IA unclear or difficult to 
effectuate; might have honored those proscriptions in the breach; or 
could have believed that additional factors, such as the necessity to 
treat the litigation explosion, were more important than the complica-
tions produced by conflicting and redundant local measures. 
One critical consideration that seemingly prompted the promul-
gation and enforcement of many local strictures, a significant percent-
age of which were inconsistent or duplicative, was the felt need to 
address the growing quantity and complexity of lawsuits that parties 
pursued in the appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts.192 Illustra-
tive is every circuit's imposition of conflicting local requirements that 
were intended to facilitate inexpensive, expeditious appellate resolu-
tion, by, for example, curtailing the number of appeals which receive 
oral arguments or written opinions.193 The district courts and individ-
ual trial judges correspondingly prescribed local measures, certain of 
which were inconsistent or redundant, to accommodate the manage-
rial judging and additional measures that treated their expanding and 
increasingly complicated caseloads.194 Factors that are closely related 
to these propositions and each other were the importance of addr.ess-
ing peculiar, problematic local conditions, which the federal rules fre-
quently ignored,195 and of experimenting with innovative procedures 
for resolving litigation, especially mechanisms that promised to foster 
economical, prompt dispute disposition.196 . 
The adoption of some conflicting or duplicative local require-
ments may have reflected the attempts of appellate courts, districts, 
192 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text; see also UPWARD SPIRAL, supra 
note 144. 
193 See, e.g., lsr Cm. R. 34.l(a); 5TH Cm. R. 47.5, 47.6; see also THOMAS E. BAKER, 
RATIONING JusricE ON APPEAL 108-35 (1994). See generally CoMM'M ON STRUCTURAL 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. CouRTS OF APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS 101-16 (1998) (ana-
lyzing case management practices); JoE CECIL & DONNA STJENsrRA, DECIDING CAsES 
WITHOUT .ARGUMENT: A"' EXAMINATION OF FouR CouRTS OF APPEALS (1987) (analyzing 
the resolution of cases without oral argument). 
194 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. 
195 See Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Unif onnity, 
50 U. PITT. L. REv. 853, 868-71 (1989); see also Carrington, supra note 86, at 946. 
196 See Levin, supra; note 58, at 1579-80; Tobias, supra note 15, at 1633-34. 
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and judges to improve on the national rule revisors' work or the per-
ception that these entities' efforts were erroneous or misguided.197 
Additional inconsistent or repetitive local strictures could be ascribed 
to those judicial officers whom Judge Robert Keeton characterizes as 
the "unduly willful renegades among us trial judges" or to the con-
comitant predilections of judicial officials who might be described as 
"procedural activists. "198 
2. Reasons for Limited Implementation 
Numerous concepts, some of which resemble the reasons offered 
above for the growth of conflicting and redundant local procedures, 
explain the limited implementation accorded those commands re-
lated to proliferation in the federal civil, appellate, bankruptcy, and 
criminal rules and in the JIA. One significant reason could be that 
these rules and the JIA provided insufficiently clear guidance. For ex-
ample, consistency and duplication defy felicitous definition, while 
the entities and people responsible for conducting local review have 
seemingly experienced considerable difficulty applying the notions. 199 
More specifically, the Judicial Conference was apparently unable or 
unwilling to fulfill the broad oversight role of affirmatively scrutiniz-
ing and abrogating or changing inconsistent or repetitive local appel-
late measures that FRAP 4 7 and the statute envisioned because the 
Conference confined review to those procedures, which others have 
challenged and only suggested that appellate courts modify strictures 
found problematic. 200 
Even had the instructions been clearer, most institutions and in-
dividuals which the Court and Congress assigned monitoring duties 
might have been reluctant to effectuate rigorously the obligations im-
posed out of deference to certain instrumentalities and persons, or 
because they were more concerned about other phenomena, namely 
the need to treat expanding caseloads.2°1 For instance, the Judicial 
Conference may have acceded to the appellate courts when analyzing 
local strictures, while appellate court judges who were members of cir-
197 "Local court tinkering with the Federal Rules is inspired by a belief that the 
[national] rulemakers got it wrong." Robel, supra note 86, at 1484; accord Cavanagh, 
supra note 79, at.603-04. 
198 Keeton, supra note 195, at 860; see also Telephone Interview with Lauren Robel, 
Professor of Law, University of Indiana (Apr. 14, 1997). 
199 See 14 MooRE's 3d, supra note 54, § 83.04; Heiser, supra note 1, at 563 n.44. 
200 See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text; see also Letter from Daniel Co-
quillette, J. Donald Monan Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, to Carl To-
bias (Aug. 9, 1996) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review). 
201 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1406-11; Tobias, supra no~e 152, at 363-64. 
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cuit councils could have deferred to district judges in reviewing their 
local procedures. The belief that the appellate courts and judges 
know more about appeals and about inexpensive, expeditious appel-
late dispute resolution generally and within their courts might have 
animated the Conference. The appellate court judges on councils 
may correspondingly have acceded because they thought that district 
courts and judges _are more familiar with the disposition of trial court 
litigation generally and within each district and individual judge's 
courtroom. Additional judges, serving on the Conference or circuit 
councils, might have deferentially evaluated local measures out of per-
sonal or professional courtesy or respect for those officers who hold 
identical positions in the judicial hierarchy. 
Judges, who were members of the Judicial Conference, circuit 
councils, or districts, could have experienced certain "conflicts of in-
terest" in discharging their local review duties. One significant, ge-
neric conflict implicated every judge's responsibilities to adopt new, 
and amend existing, local strictures while closely analyzing the proce-
dures that other courts or judges promulgated. Few judges seemingly 
wished to scrutinize, much less abolish or alter, requirements which 
the jurists might have been contemplating for, or may have already 
promulgated in, their courts because the judges were apparently more 
concerned about advancing what they perceived as those courts' best 
interests than about limiting proliferation. 
Some of these judges could concomitantly have thought that they 
lacked the requisite ·familiarity with local conditions in the appellate 
courts, districts, or courtrooms whose measures they were assessing to 
institute or recommend efficacious modifications, even in procedures 
deemed inconsistent or duplicative. Implicit and probably express in 
certain ideas above is the sensitive character of local review. For ex-
ample, many district judges jealously guard their prerogatives to pre-
scribe and enforce local strictures, particularly individual-judge 
practices. 
Underlying, and perhaps driving, the limited implementation wit-
nessed was the apparent belief of numerous Judicial Conference and 
circuit judicial council members and specific judges that the problems 
attributable to conflicting and redundant local requirements are less 
significant than other factors, such as the importance of addressing 
expanding, and increasingly complex, caseloads. For instance, those 
judges who feel inundated by burgeoning, complicated dockets may 
well find that the need for economical, prompt dispute disposition 
outweighs the perceived necessity to reduce inconsistent and duplica-
tive local measures. 
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Even had the institutions and people charged with restnctmg 
local proliferation been more favorably disposed toward fully effectu-
ating the commands in the federal rules and the JIA, additional con-
siderations might have frustrated comprehensive implementation. 
For example, the Supreme Court and Congress assigned burdensome 
responsibilities for reviewing local strictures to entities and individuals 
with relatively few resources for performing a broad spectrum of oner-
ous duties. More specifically, the circuit judicial councils discharge 
numerous administrative tasks, while appellate and district court 
judges must resolve multiplying, complex caseloads economically and 
expeditiously. Congress appropriated no funding to satisfy the new 
obligations, despite the important difficulties enumerated above. The 
Court and Congress also failed to even charge an instrumentality with 
responsibility for monitoring compliance with any of the local review 
mandates, much less for attempting to insure their rigorous effectua-
tion. For instance, the Court or Congress could have delegated this 
duty to existing institutions, including the Judicial Conference, the 
Federal Judicial Center, or the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts, or created a new entity, such as a "standing committee" 
on local procedures. 
Finally, Congress passed the CJRA which effectively suspended 
compliance with the commands respecting proliferation of local civil, 
but also other, procedures in the federal rules and the JIA. The CJRA 
expressly empowered districts and judges to adopt local measures for 
reducing expense and delay in civil litigation and implicitly en-
couraged their promulgation and application of inconsistent stric-
tures. The CJRA also created circuit review committees and assigned 
them unclear oversight duties, while the committees' composition dif-
fered substantially from circuit judicial councils because the commit-
tees consisted almost exclusively of chief district judges. Many districts 
and judges, thus, may have believed that the CJRA constituted a con-
gressional mandate to prescribe new local requirements, some of 
which were conflicting. Most circuit councils, districts, and individual 
judges could concomitantly have been reluctant to institute efforts 
aimed at limiting proliferation, and others might have found ineffi-
cient the continuation of attempts to review non-civil procedures, 
given the uncertainty which the CJRA had engendered. In short, the 
CJRA essentially supplanted implementation of the local review com-
mands in the federal civil, appellate, bankruptcy, and criminal rules as 
well as the JIA. 
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C. Implications of Li'f!lited Implementation 
The growing number of local procedures, many of which were 
inconsistent or redundant, and the corresponding failure or unwill-
ingness of the entities and individuals responsible for review to effec-
tuate thoroughly the mandates respecting proliferation in several 
federal rules and the ]IA had numerous significant implications. Most 
of them pertain to all of the local strictures, oversight institutions, and 
review commands, while I expressly or implicitly examined above cer-
tain of these consequences. 
There have been important ramifications of power's concentra-
tion in the federal district courts, which local procedural proliferation 
and the concomitant inability or reluctance to implement compre-
hensively local review mandates effected. 202 The accretion in these 
courts of much more authority, particularly power that is essentially 
unreviewable and for which judges effectively do not account, can 
have substantial implications for judges, attorneys, and parties, as well 
as for Congress, procedural amendment instrumentalities, and the 
justice system.2°3 Quite significant, power's accumulation vests great 
trust in the judgement of a single person and expands considerably 
the already enormous authority of the state which federal judges 
exercise. 204 
Reliance on this expanded power and, indeed, its very existence, 
may often redound to the advantage of lawyers and litigants that have 
more financial or political power, are "repeat players" or are situated 
in a particular district and could benefit district courts vis-a-vis most 
additional entities and people. 205 Courts of the first instance can ap-
ply, and even abuse, their enhanced authority, especially when manag-
202 See Levin, supra note 58, at 1572..,73; Tobias, supra note 19, at 1422-27; see al,so 
Yeazell, supra note 60, at 631-32, 676-78. 
203 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1422-27; Tobias, supra note 15, at 1625-32. 
204 See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Tenn-Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 6-11 (1983); see al,sojudith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, Images 
of justice, 96YALE LJ.1727, 1764-68 (1987). 
205 Several qualifications apply. The power's exercise can vary among cases and 
judges, depending, for example, on judges' political views and temperament. See To-
bias, supra note 19, at 1424; see al,so Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 95, 97-124 (1974) (dis-
cussing repeat players). The assertions may seem crudely instrumental, but a recent 
study of employment discrimination litigation showed that some judges' procedural 
application disadvantaged plaintiffs. See Phyllis Baumann et al., Substance in the 
Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 
B.C. L. REv. 211, 296-335 (1992) (discussing how the Supreme Court has used both 
substantive and procequral law to favor defendants in Title VII cases); see al,so Tobias, 
supra note 2. 
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ing the pretrial process, which local proliferation frequently 
accommodates, in ways that detrimentally affect some attorneys and 
parties. For instance, district court judges may have exercised this 
power in the pretrial process to control and attempt to end civil litiga-
tion by extracting settlements from reluctant lawyers and litigants.206 
The increasing emphasis on; the ever-expanding number of steps 
in; the growing demands for writing, filing, and signing documents 
and for attending conferences during;207 and the enhanced judicial 
decisionmaking necessitated at the pretrial phase208 have facilitated 
power's accretion. The application of this enlarged authority has dis-
advantaged most counsel and parties with the least economic and po-
litical power. A clear illustration of these concepts is that the need to 
research and draft the papers and to participate in the activities has 
further depleted their scarce resources and complicated efforts to 
prove cases, reach trial, and complete litigation.2°9 
The accumulation of authority in courts of original jurisdiction, 
particularly when conjoined with increasing judicial discretion, which 
the 1938 federal rules and numerous subsequent revisions have af-
forded, has· similarly affected counsel and litigants who possess little 
time, money, or political influence. Judicial discretion is an instru-
ment of power, the exercise of which frequently has the most detri-
mental impacts on these attorneys and parties.210 For example,judges 
have applied the broad discretion which many federal rules bestow on 
them to require that the lawyers and litigants tender documents or 
206 See, e.g., Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 45-47 (E.D. Ky. 1987); see also 
Yeazell, supra note 60, at 657-59. In Lockhart, the authority's exercise was blatant and 
was invoked against an insurer. It often is subtler and is used against those with less 
power and resources. See, e.g., Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 884-85 (7th 
Cir. 1988); Williams v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res., 789 F.2d 881, 881-82 (11th Cir. 
1986); see also Baumann et al., supra note 205, at 286-88; Tobias, supra note 2, at 
310-19. 
207 Some of these requirements elaborate or complement the already substantial 
demands, such as those in Rules 11, 16, and 26. See supra notes 50-59 and accompa-
nying text. 
208 Greater demands in pretrial have disadvantaged federal judges. For example, 
presiding over more increasingly complicated conferences and making more deci-
sions consume scarce judicial resources and limit other duties' discharge. See Tobias, 
supra note 19, at 1423. · 
209 Increased emphasis on pretrial and trial's deemphasis can disadvantage lawyers 
and litigants, who pursue, for exa!Ilple, personal injury or job discrimination litigation 
because they are more likely to succeed before juries in trials. See Baumann et al., 
supra note 205. 
210 See Burbank, supra note 77, at 1470; see also Tobias, supra note 2, at 296-335; 
Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BuFF. L. REv. 485, '490-506 
(1988-1989). 
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attend conferences or ADR sessions, which has additionally strained 
their limited resources and made cases' pursuit more difficult.211 
Authority's concentration in courts of the first instance, espedally 
as encouraged by growing numbers of inconsistent and duplicative lo-
cal procedures, has had related, important pragmatic consequences, 
such as making federal civil practice even more complex. For exam-
ple, the local proliferation, which CJRA experimentation typified and 
exacerbated, has complicated the efforts of all attorneys and clients, 
but particularly those who lack financial or political power, or are situ-
ated outside a specific district, to discover, comprehend, and satisfy 
local strictures, whose adoption and enforcement have detrimentally 
affected them.212 The need to search for, understand, and comply 
with increasingly arcane local requirements may well have imposed 
greater expense and delay in federal civil litigation. It is ironic that 
procedure has experienced expanding balkanization, even as federal 
practice has become more nationalized and internationalized. 
The accretion of authority has also contracted the procedural 
opportunities that are available. These constricted possibilities are ex-
emplified by the imposition of numerical restrictions on interrogato-
ries and depositions, 213 which have adversely affected counsel and 
litigants with few resources or limited access to information that is im-
portant to their cases because they need greater discovery to acquire 
this material.214 
Numerous district judges have informally applied the enlarged 
authority, particularly when managing the pretrial process, while that 
and numerous other exercises of power have received little appellate 
scrutiny. This authority's invocation has detrimentally affected all law-
yers and parties; however, its application has most disadvantaged, and 
chilled the enthusiasm of, those attorneys and litigants who lack 
money and power, as they have less ability to withstand the authority's 
application. Many of the above ideas have meant that public interest 
entities, such as the ACLU or the National Wildlife Federation, which 
participate in litigation in multiple districts, may experience problems 
vindicating rights and interests in the Constitution and federal 
statutes.215 
211 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1422-27; see also Tobias, supra note 15, at 1621-24. 
212 See Cavanagh, supra note 79, at 603-04; Tobias, supra note 19, at 1422-27; 
Tobias, supra note 15, at 1611; see also LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 112, at 59. 
213 See FED. R Crv. P. 30(a), 33(a); Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 449, 461 (1993). 
214 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1424; Tobias, supra note 210, at 495-98. 
215 See Cavanagh, supra note 79, at 603-04; Tobias, supra note 19, at 1423; see also 
Tobias, supra note 210, at 495-98. 
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Those judges who have invoked this enhanced authority have cor-
respondingly exercised it at the expense of Congress, thus undermin-
ing legislative branch power.216 For example, when federal districts or 
specific judges adopt local strictures which conflict with or repeat 
commands in federal rules or the United States Code, the local mea-
sures can erode those national mandates and avoid the legislative re-
view which the Rules Enabling Act prescribes for federal rules 
amendments.21 7 To the extent that district judges have promulgated, 
construed, or applied local procedural requirements in ways that inap-
propriately discouraged lawyers and litigants, such as civil rights plain-
tiffs, whose enthusiastic pursuit of cases Congress expressly instructed 
the courts to foster in substantive, procedural, and fee-shifting stat-
utes, the judiciary has concomitantly frustrated legislative intent and 
increased judicial authority vis-a-vis congressional power. 2 1s 
Authority's concentration, particularly as promoted by local 
procedural proliferation, has correspondingly had deleterious institu-
tional impacts, undermining the power, prestige, and work of national 
rule revision bodies, such as the Standing Committee.219 These enti-
ties have generally trained their significant expertise and systemic per-
spective on the protection and improvement of a national, uniform 
procedural regime; have developed federal rules changes which are 
best for all ninety-four federal district courts; and have limited the 
potential for district judges to accumulate or exercise excessive or 
abusive authority, especially through the prescription and enforce-
ment of inconsistent or redundant local strictures.220 The growing 
localization of federal civil procedure that local proliferation has en-
couraged, by instituting a procedural scheme which is premised on 
less expertise and is more parochial and by reducing the perceived 
216 See Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discov-
ery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1443-44 
(1994); see also Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal 
Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 933, 961-63 (1991); Tobias, supra note 2, at 296-98. 
217 See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994). District judges who rely on the CJRA to adopt 
conflicting local measures frustrate the intent of Congress and the Court in the JIA 
and Rule 83 to limit inconsistency, but judges have honored these in the breach, and 
the CJRA seems to authorize conflicts. See supra notes 16-26, 33-34, 48-92, 94-110, 
113-23 and accompanying text. 
218 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1424-25. The activity also undermines the statu-
tory beneficiaries' vindication of substantive rights. See id. 
219 See Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in judicial Rulemaking: Factional Politics Is 
jeopardizing the Federal Rulemaking Process, 75 JUDICATURE 161, 161-66 (1991); Tobias, 
supra note 19, at 1426. 
220 See Mullenix, supra note 105, at 830-43; Tobias, supra note 216, at 961-63. 
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necessity for federal amendments, has seemingly eroded the national 
revisors' influence and even challenged their relevance.221 
The accretion of authority in districts, particularly authority that 
is fostered by enhanced judicial discretion to manage the increasingly 
emphasized pretrial stage, has detrimentally affected the civil justice 
system. The prior developments in procedure, such as the growth of 
managerial judging, especially as elaborated by the CJRA's effectua-
tion-mandating that attorneys and parties draft and file more docu-
ments and participate in increased activities, expanding litigation's 
steps and enlarging ADR's importance-have arguably complicated 
attempts to detect the truth and to reach the merits of cases while 
decreasing the quality of justice secured. Indeed, the earlier develop-
ments, as compounded by the CJRA implementation, have apparently 
produced impacts quite diffc;:rent from ones which Congress envi-
sioned: they may have led to expense and delay in civil lawsuits, nar-
rower federal court access, and fewer fair and merits-based 
resolutions.222 The civil litigation system can even lose respect when 
the public believes that the procedures available or the character of 
justice can vary substantially across districts, that the nature of justice 
reflects lawsuits' magnitude or subject matter, that attorneys' or cli-
ents' resources affect the quality of justice, or that complexities or 
technicalities preclude or restrict the vindication of rights. 22s 
D: Lessons from Local Proliferation and Limited Implementation 
Numerous lessons can be derived from the experience involving 
local procedural proliferation and the limited implementation that 
the Judicial Conference, circuit judicial councils, appellate and dis-
trict courts, and specific judges have accorded commands which the 
Supreme Court and Congress intended to rectify or ameliorate detri-
mental effects, which the growing number of conflicting and redun-
221 See Mullenix, supra note 76, at 400; Tobias, supra note 19, at 1426. 
222 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1426-27; see also Cavanagh, supra note 79, at 603; 
supra notes 33-60, 69-112 and accompanying text. 
223 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1427. Because federal c~vil procedure is in its 
worst condition since the 1938 federal rules' adoption, state civil procedure may be 
even more fragmented, especially in states that model their procedural systems on the 
federal analogues. See generally John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in 
State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367 
(1986) (surveying state court systems and identifying their reliance on the federal 
system); Edward F. Sherman, A Process Model and Agenda for Civil justice Refurms- in the 
States, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1553 (1994) (recommending that state court systems examine 
and reform their existing systems). 
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dant local strictures imposed. Certain of these ideas are expressly 
stated or implicit in much of the above assessment. 
The efforts of the Court and Congress to restrict proliferation 
afford several lessons. Those endeavors teach that initiatives aimed at 
reducing proliferation must be harmonized with other activities, most 
notably the attempts to decrease cost and delay through managerial 
judging or the CJRA, which were frequently premised on inconsistent 
local requirements. The experience also shows that institutions and 
individuals charged with conducting local procedural review must 
have clear guidance and adequate resources. Moreover, the work 
should be carefully structured. For instance, appellate court judges 
may be very reluctant, or perhaps unable, to scrutinize, much less ab-
rogate or modify, measures which the jurists believe district judges 
prescribe to improve their courts. This unwillingness could reflect a 
lack of experience with local strictures, concomitant limited apprecia-
tion of the circumstances in particular districts or respect for col-
leagues with whom the reviewers must maintain ongoing, cordial 
relations. It might even be preferable to lodge the ultimate authority 
for abrogating or changing local provisions in entities or people with 
the requisite expertise, distance, and commitment to undertake rigor-
ous review and eliminate or alter conflicting or duplicative require-
ments when indicated. 
Certain of these phenomena, particularly the failure to reconcile 
the CJRA and the JIA, mean that the legislative and judicial branches 
must cooperate more when formulating federal court policy and that 
the condition of federal civil procedure is considerably worse than in 
1988 when Congress found it unacceptable. Indeed, an important 
irony of CJRA experimentation was that it has sensitized many mem-
bers of the bench and bar to the need for consistent, simple proce-
dures and has fostered their adoption or scrutiny of reforms, which 
would reduce growing disuniformity and complexity. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The first two Parts of this Article illustrated how prior devel-
opments in civil procedure, such as managerial judging, and rather 
recent one.s, namely the CJRA's implementation, encouraged the ex-
pansion of local strictures and that increasing numbers of these provi-
sions conflicted with or repeated federal rules or statutes. The initial 
Parts correspondingly showed that certain institutions and individuals 
with responsibility for restricting the quantity, inconsistency, and re-
dundancy of local measures were unable or reluctant to discharge 
their duties and why proliferating requirements should be limited. 
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Moreover, I recognized that numerous entities and people could de-
crease conflicting and duplicative local strictures in various ways, while 
proliferation is only a single phenomenorr, albeit symptomatic of 
other important ones, which comprise the modern procedural 
landscape. 
Congress, the Judicial Conference, circuit judicial councils, ap-
pellate and district courts, and individual judges should undertake 
concerted efforts to reduce local mechanisms' growing inconsistency 
and redundancy, which have imposed the above disadvantages, partic-
ularly by further fragmenting the already fractured state of procedure 
and increasing expense and delay. These implementing instrumental-
ities and persons must capitalize on the finest and abolish or amelio-
rate the worst features of the 1988 JIA, the 1990 CJRA, and the federal 
rules that implicate local proliferation, such as the local review pre-
scriptions in certain 1985 and 1995 revisions as well as the local varia-
tion provisions in the 1993 civil rule amendments.224 'They can realize 
those goals by restoring and maintaining the primacy of all the federal 
rules that govern civil, appellate, bankruptcy, criminal, and admiralty 
procedure and of the national revision process; by reattaining the pro-
cedural status quo which existed in 1988, principally through the expi-
ration of the CJRA and of conflicting and repetitive measures adopted 
thereunder; and by thoroughly effectuating the local review mandates 
in the federal rules and the JIA. 
A. A Word About Empirical Information 
The maximum applicable empirical material must inform deci-
sionmaking on the future of the CJRA, the JIA, and the federal rules, 
as well as attempts to limit proliferation. The Judicial Conference, the 
RAND Corporation, and the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) have col-
lected, analyzed, and synthesized much empirical data on the require-
ments applied in pilot and demonstration courts, the other seventy-
nine districts apparently have similar information on testing under 
the 1990 statute, and the Judicial Center and the Administrative Of-
fice of the United States Courts possess, or have access to, additional 
material on all ninety-four courts. In every appellate and district 
court, numerous institutions and people involved with CJRA experi-
mentation and with efforts to implement the provisions for local pro-
cedural review and amendment in the respective federal rules and the 
224 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1625-32; see also supra notes 62-63, 98-106, 
113-23 and accompanying text; infra note 242 and accompanying text. In fairness, 
the 2000 revisions abolished some, but retained a few local option provisions. See 
supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text. 
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JIA have correspondingly gathered information or gleaned ideas that 
could improve future policymaking. 
Most important to local proliferation's reduction is systematically 
assembling, evaluating, and synthesizing the greatest amount of rele-
vant empirical data on the total quantity of local measures which actu-
ally exist, as well as the precise number that are inconsistent or 
redundant and exactly how they conflict or are duplicative. For exam-
ple, the preceding examination demonstrated the need to improve 
comprehension of proliferation and to accumulate much greater, and 
considerably more refined, information on local appellate, bank-
ruptcy, criminal, and admiralty rules. There is concomitantly a strik-
ing dearth of material on strictures, namely individualjudge practices, 
which are not local rules in all of the above areas and in civil proce-
dure, primarily because many of these mechanisms are unwritten and 
legal scholars and those responsible for monitoring the measures have 
minimally SCrtltinized them. It would also be helpful to have a clearer 
understanding of the entities and persons officially charged with 
adopting and reviewing local requirements and how they have ful-
filled the duties imposed and have interacted. 
A useful starting point might be the data on local strictures which 
the Local Rules Project compiled and classified for potential inconsis-
tency and redundancy, although this information may be somewhat 
dated because courts and judges have applied, particularly under the 
rubric of civil justice reform, numerous, additional conflicting and du-
plicative local procedures since 1989.225 The Administrative Office, 
the FJC, and each of the appellate and district courts have, or could 
collect, many local measures, and they might evaluate these measures, 
especially techniques adopted under the CJRA. Several rather new 
local procedural services, one of which is an electronic database, also 
afford valuable access to a number of applicable local require-
ments. 226 Other helpful sources, principally of informative insights 
for attempting to limit proliferation, are the local district reviews per-
formed by the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Judicial Councils and by 
some districts. 227 
After those responsible for gathering and analyzing all of the rele-
vant local mechanisms have completed this task, they ought to catego-
rize the measures in terms of possible inconsistency and duplication. 
225 See REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 49. 
226 See, e.g., DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL CouRT GUIDELINES (1996); FEDERAL LOCAL 
CouRT RuLEs, supra note 147; see also Westlaw, US-RULES database, http:// 
www.westlaw.com. 
227 See supra notes 151-61, 173-76 and accompanying text; infra notes 244-47 and 
accompanying text. 
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Courts and judges adopting the procedures found in conflict or repet-
itive should be permitted to abolish or modify the strictures, and, if 
they reject these opportunities, appropriate authorities, such as Con-
gress, must eliminate or change the requirements. 
B. Suggestions Regarding the CJRA 
Congress should conclusively decide the fate of the CJRA before 
efforts to restrict proliferation are revived and comprehensively imple-
mented because definitive resolution will facilitate those endeavors. 
For instance, if Congress determines that the 1990 Act ought to ex-
pire, districts and judges should abrogate inconsistent or redundant 
procedures, which they adopted under the legislation, thereby obviat-
ing the need to review a number of existing local measures and signifi-
cantly simplifying the work. 
Congress should thoroughly assess the maximum amount of per-
tinent information on the unprecedented CJRA experiment with 
mechanisms for decreasing expense and delay in civil litigation. It 
may seem somewhat premature, particularly before Congress has fully 
absorbed the 1997 Judicial Conference report and recommendations 
on the pilot project and report on the demonstration program and 
much additional, relevant information on experimentation, to posit 
very conclusive determinations about the efficacy of strictures that 
judges applied. However, the Conference works, the expert, rigorous 
evaluations which the RAND Corporation and the FJC recently fin-
ished, and the considerable material on the remaining courts suggest 
that the statute should have expired in December 1997 when it was 
apparently scheduled to sunset, although Congress has not conclu-
sively prescribed expiration. 228 
228 See Carl Tobias, The Judidal Conference Report and the Conclusion of Federal Civil 
JusticeRefonn, 175 F.R.D. 351, 360 (1998); see alsoJCR, supra note 7l;JAMES KAKALIKET 
AL., Jusr, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CAsE MANAGEMENT 
UNDER THE CIVILJusrICE REFORM Acr (1996); DoNNA STIENsrRA ET AL., REPORT TO 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CAsE MANAGEMENT, 
A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS EsrABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL Jus. 
TICE REFORM Acr OF 1990 (1997). Recent legislation arguably suggests expiration, but 
it is too tense to be definitive. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-518, 114 Stat. 2411, ~414. See generally Carl Tobias, Did tlze Civil justice Refonn 
Act of 1990 Actually Expire?, 31 U. M1cH.J.L. REFORM 887 (1998). The Advisory Com-
mittee commissioned two follow up studies on discovery. See James S. Kakalik et al., 
Discovery Management: Further Anao•sis of the Civil Justice Ref onn Act Evaluation Data, 39 
B.C. L. Rev. 613 (1998); Thomas Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and 
Discwsure Practice Under tlze 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 525 (19~8). 
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Those principles, guidelines and techniques, and other require-
ments which courts implemented under the CJRA that clearly saved 
cost or time and which respected additional, important procedural 
tenets, such as simplicity, and process values should receive national 
application through incorporation in the federal rules. 229 Devices, 
the effectiveness of which remains uncertain, may warrant considera-
tion in the ordinary process of federal rule revision. The measures 
that displayed promise in reducing expense or delay but seemed insuf-
ficiently efficacious to deserve nationwide prescription because the 
mechanisms conserved unclear amounts of money or time, or they 
could threaten other procedural precepts might be identified for fur-
ther selective testing. Congress should replace the CJRA's experimen-
tal methods with an approach which is premised on a 1991 proposed 
amendment of Rule 83 that the revision entities apparently retracted 
in deference to contemporaneous civil justice reform testing. This 
recommended change would have permitted districts which secured 
Judicial Confer~nce approval to experiment with inconsistent local 
rules for not more than five years. 23o 
Current information indicates that Congress should conclusively 
provide for the 1990 Act's expiration, which means that districts and 
judges must abolish strictures adopted under the CJRA which contra-
vene or duplicate federal rules or United States Code provisions. It is 
rather difficult to designate definitively those devices that warrant na-
tional adoption because all relevant data have yet to be evaluated and 
synthesized systematically, and their analyses have not been com-
pleted. However, sufficiently conclusive determinations can be formu-
lated by employing the Judicial Conference reports and suggestions, 
the RAND and FJC assessments, and much material which is available 
from other sources, such as the courts that experimented. Some mea-
sures in the general areas of case management, ADR, and discovery, as 
well as a few mechanisms which were not among the eleven principles, 
guidelines, and techniques that the CJRA specifically prescribed will 
seemingly decrease cost or delay and honor significant procedural 
tenets and process values. 
229 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (1994); see also 
Burbank, supra note 77, at 1466-71 (discussing process values). 
230 See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 111, at 152; Carl Tobias, A Modest Refonn for 
Federal Procedural Rulemaking, 64 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Summer 2001, at 283; To-
bias, supra note 15, at 1630-32. Testing could also be premised on the approach used 
with court-annexed arbitration. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 ( 1994); see also Amendment 
to thejudicial Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 105-53, § 1, 111Stat.1173 (1997). See 
generally BARBARA s. MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT 
COURTS (1990) (reporting findings of a study on court-annexed arbitration). 
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More particular ideas can be offered. For example, differenti-
ated case management apparently worked in the two demonstration 
courts which extensively practiced it and in additional districts for 
complicated and routine or ordinary litigation; however, numerous 
judges concluded that the disadvantages of categorizing suits into 
tracks overrode the benefits. 231 Invocation of various alternatives to 
dispute resolution in a number of courts seemed to afford fiscal or 
temporal savings, but more districts found that most ADR measures 
minimally reduced expense or delay while imposing considerable 
cost.232 Certain discovery techniques, such as the use of telephone 
conference calls to resolve discovery disputes, also apparently saved 
money or time. 233 
Several difficulties that principally implicated automatic disclo-
sure' s effectuation complicate analysis of its efficacy. These include 
the controversial nature of the federal revision adopted, erratic appli-
cation by a number of districts which formally adopted the device, the 
lack of evaluation accorded the mechanism, and the unclear determi-
nations reached in the assessm~nts performed. Anecdotal material 
concomitantly indicates that the procedure's effectiveness is context-
specific.234 Disclosure, thus, probably warrants refinement by confin-
ing its use to circumstances in which the technique appeared particu-
larly efficacious or by authorizing continued experimentation m 
courts that most successfully applied the device. 235 
231 See, e.g., DIFFERENTIATED CAsE MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRIGI" 
COURT FOR THE w. DISTRIGI" OF MICHIGAN, ANNUAL AssESSMENT 37 (1995); U.S. DIS-
TRIGI" COURT FOR THE N. DISTRIGI" OF OHIO, ANNUAL AssESSMENT OF CIVIL AND CRIMI-
NAL DOCKET 1-3 (1993); see all-oJCR, supra note 71, at 90-93; STIENSTRA ET AL., supra 
note 228, at 7-15, 29-132; Cavanagh, supra note 79, at 595. 
232 See, e.g., JCR, supra note 71, at 99-102; STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 228, at 
173-282; Cavanagh, supra note 79, at 585-86, 605-06; Memorandum from Kent 
Snapp & Deborah Bell, to Judges in the Western District of Missouri (Oct. 22, 1996) 
(on file with author). See generally ELIZABETH PIAPINGER & DONNA STEINSTRA, ADR 
AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL D1srruGI" CouRTS (1996) (reporting the findings of a 
study of several district courts). Congress did pass the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Act of 1998. See Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (1998). 
233 See Counsel Connect Debates; Civil justice Reform; Five Year.5 Later, TEx. LAw., Feb. 
24, 1997, at 28; Telephone Interview with D. Brock Hornby, Chief Judge, U.S. District 
Court for the District of Maine Uan. 29, 1997); see all-o JCR, supra note 71, at 81-85 
(affording "alternative" program to expansion of CJRA measures); STIENSTRA ET AL., 
supra note 228, at 10-11. 
234 See Cavanagh, supra note 79, at 605; Tobias, "supra note 15, at 1615; see all-o 
supra notes 94-106 and accompanying text. 
235 These ideas are premised on testing to date andJCR SeeJCR, supra note 71, at 
97-98; DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
23-28 (1997) [hereinafter DISCLOSURE STUDY]; Cavanagh, supra note 79, at 594-95, 
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It now appears that the Supreme Court or Congress should omit 
all of the local option measures, which the Court, primarily out of 
deference to ongoing CJRA experimentation, included in 1993 
amendments to several discovery provisions and which the Court has 
included in other rules. 236 The mechanism has imposed greater dis-
advantages, involving uniformity and simplicity as well as concomitant 
expense and delay, than benefits in terms of increased flexibility for 
testing discovery procedures calibmted to specific districts' 
situations. 237 
C. After the CJRA: Comprehensive Implementation of the Local Review 
Requirements in the Federal Rules and the ]IA 
I have championed the reattainment of the 1988 procedural sta-
tus quo and the systematic implementation of the prescriptions in-
cluded in several federal rules and tlie JIA. The provisions for limiting 
local proliferation are obviously most relevant, although Congress and 
the Supreme Court also intended to restore and maintain the primacy 
of all the federal rules and the national revision process, to open the 
federal rule amendment process, and to regularize and open local 
p~ocedural revision. Thorough effectuation of the elements covering 
local review in the federal rules and the 1988 legislation, which imple-
mentation of the 1990 CJRA essentially discontinued, together ·with 
the above-proposed resolution of CJRA experimentation, could sub-
stantially reduce the number of inconsistent and duplicative local 
requirements. 
Congress, the Court, and the Judicial Conference should clearly 
reiterate the critical need for all entities and individuals with responsi-
bility for proliferation to discharge these duties while affording them 
another opportunity to fulfill the obligations. Congress could facili-
tate the short-term performance of those tasks and the periodic local 
review envisioned in the federal rules and the JIA by providing the 
requisite resources while definitively stating that the CJRA has expired 
and that conflicting or redundant mechanisms adopted under the 
statute must also expire. 
604-05; Tobias, supra note 15, at 1615; see also Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340, 382-84 (2000) (revising Rule 26 to narrow disclosure's 
scope). 
236 See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 106-10 
(omitting some, but retaining a few local option provisions). 
237 See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text; see also D1scLOSURE STUDY, 
supra note 235, at 3, 9, 42-43; JCR, supra note 71, at 98; infra notes 252-56 and ac-
companying text (suggesting more limited use of local option measures in the federal 
rules). 
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1. General Ideas 
The above examination of prior attempts at effectuating the re-
sponsibilities, which Congress and the Court imposed in the federal 
rules and the 1988 ]IA to restrict proliferation, suggests that they se-
lected a method and implementing instrumentalities which realized 
comparatively limited success and that there are preferable ways to 
proceed. Indeed, the approach as well as the institutions and people 
chosen were arguably so inadvisable or ip.efficacious that renewed ef-
fectuation would merely perpetuate a system which has proved 
unworkable. 
These ideas are not intended to denigrate the perceptive recogni-
tion by Congress and the Court of the troubling complications that 
proliferation had created or their conscientious efforts to treat those 
problems or of the endeavors of implementing entities and individu-
als in attempting to institute the regime presciibed. In fact, those re-
sponsible for review should have another opportunity to satisfy the 
mandates in the federal rules and the 1988 JIA. 
It is difficult to overstate the mammoth, complicated nature of 
the duties assigned, particularly given the enormous number of local 
procedures, a phenomenon which CJRA experimentation com-
pounded, and the complexities entailed in clearly defining and felici-
tously applying the concepts of inconsistency and duplication. 
Congress and the Court correspondingly imposed these substantial re-
sponsibilities on institutions and persons with few resources for com-
pleting myriad, onerous obligations, but Congress allocated no 
funding to perform the new tasks. The CJRA also seemed to mandate 
or at least authorize the application of conflicting and redundant lo-
cal strictures so that many districts and judges could have felt obli-
gated to prescribe, and numerous reviewers may hav~ been unwilling 
to evaluate, these measures. The 1990 Act, therefore, encouraged the 
enforcement of violative requirements while essentially suspending 
most efforts which might have limited proliferation. 
Despite the above problems, it apparently remained much easier 
to identify offending local provisions than to discharge the very deli-
cate duty that the measures' designation triggered: the abrogation or 
modification of strictures which appellate or district courts or judges 
had adopted in the belief that the techniques would improve their 
courts. Some instrumentalities and people responsible for scrutiniz-
ing and abolishing or changing those local procedures deemed incon-
sistent or duplicative were understandably reluctant to eliminate or 
alter mechanisms prescribed for treating local conditions with which 
the reviewers had relatively limited familiarity. For instance, appellate 
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judges were probably loath to be perceived as infringing on district 
courts' and judges' decisions that implicated local court administra-
tion. A few district judges may correspondingly have experienced in-
trinsic conflicts of interest because the jurists had promulgated, or 
were contemplating the adoption of, similar requirements for their 
courts. 
Even the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council's attempts to scrutinize 
the local strictures of fifteen districts, efforts which were more ambi-
tious than those of most councils, remained incomplete. 238 For exam-
ple, the District Local Rules Review Committee and the Committee 
for the Review of Local Bankruptcy Rules encountered comparatively 
little difficulty in delineating many conflicting and redundant mea-
sures, and in persuading numerous districts and judges to abrogate or 
change a significant number of these requirements.239 However, both 
entities specifically excluded CJRA mechanisms from review while de-
ferring to some courts' and judges' determinations, particularly their 
prescription of inconsistent and duplicative local procedures.240 
Moreover, when the two committees recommended that the judicial 
council abolish or modify the strictures, which the committees consid-
ered conflicting or repetitive and which districts or judges did not 
change, the council was unable or reluctant to eliminate or alter these 
measures.241 
It bears reiteration that I am not criticizing Congress or the Su-
preme Court for the means, or the entities and individuals, chosen in 
attempting to limit proliferation or those conducting review. Con-
gress and the Court identified, and made good-faith efforts to address, 
difficulties imposed by proliferating procedures, although neither 
seemed to think completely thi;ough, or to appreciate conflicts be-
tween, the approaches that it employed. For instance, Congress did 
not harmonize the 1990 statute's goal of encouraging experimenta-
tion with local expense and delay reduction measures and the objec-
tive in the federal rules and the 1988 legislation of restricting local 
proliferation. Moreover, numerous developments, which were attrib-
utable to Congress or the Court, alone or synergistically discouraged 
most institutions and persons from fulfilling their review obligations. 
These included adoption of the CJRA and of certain 1993 federal 
rules amendments, concomitant reluctance to abrogate or modify 
procedures that appeared to be legislatively authorized, and failure to 
238 See supra notes 152-61, 186-91 and accompanying text. 
239 See supra notes 152-61, 186-91 and accompanying text. 
240 See supra notes 152-61, 186-91 and accompanying text. 
241 See supra notes 152-61, 186-91 and accompanying text. 
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appropriate resources for local review. In short, the concepts ex-
amined above suggest that efforts to decrease proliferation should be 
revitalized but that caution is warranted and the revived endeavors 
must be rigorously evaluated. 
• The little apparent. success attained thus far indicates the need to 
scrutinize, or at least investigate, the :µiethod. and implementing in-
strumentalities 'prescribed, particularly if a second attempt to satisfy 
the local review mandates in the federal rules and the JIA yields mini-
mal improvement. Should this assessment proceed and show that the 
course of action used was inadvisable or mfsguided or that the entities 
or people chosen to effectuate it were inappropriate, Congress or the 
Court could then explore and select approaches and implementing 
institutions or individuals offering greater promise. For example, the 
delicate nature of abolition and change of conflicting and duplicative 
local procedures may require that this task be assigned to someone 
other than colleagues of the judges who adopt the strictures, although 
this resolution might mean that Congress is the only viable choice. 
2. Specific Guidance 
a. Internal 
i. Local Procedural Adoption and Revision 
When the appellate and district courts and individual judges, 
alone or with local rules committees, contemplate promulgating new, 
or amending current, local requirements, especially inconsistent or 
redundant measures, they should exercise restraint and be sensitive to 
the problems that attend the strictures' prescription and enforce-
ment. These entities and people must only adopt additional, and re-
tain present, conflicting, or duplicative local procedures, which are 
necessary to treat peculiar, problematic local conditions or to facili-
tate the discovery of promising mechanisms. The institutions and per-
sons should correspondingly abrogate or modify all local 
requirements, particularly individual-judge practices, that contravene 
or repeat federal rules or statutes; reduce to writing, and include in 
local rules, the maximum number of local measures; and conform lo-
cal rules to the uniform numbering system prescribed by the judicial 
conference. 242 
242 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1627; supra notes 115, 123 and accompanying text; 
infra note 248 and accompanying text. 
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11. Local Procedural Review 
Insofar as appellate or district courts and judges had initiated ef-
forts to limit local proliferation which the CJRA and other phenom-
ena, such as resource deficiencies, effectively discontinued, they must 
reassume, and implement comprehensively, the affirmative review ob-
ligations assigned, while those not instituting local procedural review 
must now do so. 243 The appellate courts and district judges should 
scrutinize all current local strictures for conflicts and redundancy and 
eliminate or alter those found deficient. This examination will in-
clude requirements adopted under the aegis of the CJRA, if Congress 
does not definitively provide for the 1990 statute to sunset or if courts 
and judges retain the procedures after Congress permits the legisla-
tion to expire. Should the appellate and district courts and judges 
conscientiously assess for inconsistency and duplication all local mea-
sures and abolish or change the strictures considered violative, these 
activities could sharply restrict, and perhaps vitiate, the need for exog-
enous scrutiny. 
b. External 
i. Judicial Conference 
If appellate courts, districts, or judges fail to capitalize on these 
opportunities or conduct local procedural review that lacks sufficient 
rigor, external entities may need to assume new or greater responsibil-
ities for proliferation. For instance, the Judicial Conference, which is 
to evaluate periodically local appellate requirements and abrogate or 
alter those deemed conflicting or redundant, must fully discharge 
these duties and might want to exercise less deference than it has to 
appellate courts, which have minimally scrutinized their procedures. 
The Conference should conduct an affirmative review by identifying 
inconsistent and duplicative local measures, affording appellate courts 
opportunities to correct deficiencies, and eliminating or changing the 
strictures of those appellate courts which do not respond to its over-
tures. If the Conference is unable or reluctant to fulfill these obliga-
tions, Congress might encourage the Conference or even oversee 
compliance. 
243 Few councils apparently undertook rigorous review of local appellate stric-
tures, even though the CJRA, which only implicates district court measures, had no 
effect on this review. 
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ii. Circuit Councils 
The circuit judicial councils have analogous responsibilities for 
analyzing the districts' local requirements, most of which remain iden-
tical to the procedures that existed in 1988, as augmented by CJRA 
mechanisms. Only a few circuit councils have satisfied the duties, 
principally because the 1990 statute's effectuation essentially discon-
tinued monitoring, or because Congress budgeted no resources for 
review. Congress ought to appropriate adequate funding, while ·it 
should clearly state that the CJRA has expired and require that con-
flicting and redundant measures adopted thereunder sunset. 
The councils might correspondingly consult the models afforded 
by the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Judicial Councils' examination of 
their districts' local strictures, as these efforts show how to discharge 
these responsibilities efficaciously and facilitate compliance with lim-
ited resources.244 The Seventh Circuit Council has depended on an 
expert consultant, who served as Local Rules Project Director, to scru-: 
tinize and make recommendations annually on the procedures of the 
districts within the court's purview, while the council has stringently 
enforced the consultant's suggestions regarding inconsistency and du-
plication. 245 The Ninth Circuit Council concomitantly created a re-
view committee under the auspices of its Chief Judges' Conference, 
thereby enabling the council to secure considerable cooperation from 
the districts. For example, the courts and individual judges appar-
ently found many committee proposals for changing local require-
ments so palatable that they willingly implemented the 
recommendations. 246 The committee also relied on volunteer law 
professors and practicing attorneys to evaluate each district's local 
measures which reduced the costs of compliance.247 If the councils 
that have inadequately discharged these obligations do not respond, 
Congress or the Judicial Conference may wish to assume the duties. 
iii. National Rule Revision Entities 
The national rule revision bodies, alone or in conjunction with 
appellate and district courts and judges, might institute certain efforts 
that could limit local procedural proliferation or ameliorate certain of 
244 See Heiser, supra note 1, at 564-81; Tobias, supra note 166, at 983-94; see also 
Tobias, supra note 152, at 359-69; supra notes 152-61 and accompanying text. 
245 Telephone Internew with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 151. 
246 See supra notes 152-54, 158-60 and accompanying text. 
247 See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 187-91 and 
accompanying text (analyzing the Ninth Circuit's review of local bankruptcy 
measures). 
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its detrimental consequences. For instance, the Judicial Conference 
should promptly survey and enforce compliance with the April 1997 
deadline for uniformly numbering local strictures in its directive im-
plementing the 1995 amendments of the federal civil, appellate, bank-
ruptcy, and criminal rules. 248 Virtually all of the regional circuits have 
already conformed their local appellate rules to the FRAP.249 Moreo-
ver, numerous districts have ordered the courts' local civil and crimi-
nal rules similarly to the federal analogues, 250 but some have not. 
Non-com"f)liance may reflect mere inadvertence; resource deficiencies 
or the concomitant belief that other matters, including daily dispute 
resolution, deserve higher priority; or concern that consistency inter-
feres with local prerogatives. Those appellate and district courts 
which have not conformed their procedures should do so expedi-
tiously because uniformity will reduce ·complexity, cost, and delay in 
federal practice. 
The Judicial Conference or the Federal Advisory Committees 
might also thoroughly review, and seriously consider eliminating, any 
remaining local option provisions in the respective federal rules for 
which no compelling need exists. These prescriptions expressly au-
thorize the appellate courts, districts, and judges to promulgate and 
apply conflicting and redundant local requirements or recognize that 
they might do so, phenomena which can complicate federal litigation 
and can be expensive and time-consuming. Illustrative are varying 
publication practices that a Judicial Conference resolution en-
couraged appellate courts to prescribe251 and the local option 
provisos governing discovery in the 1993 civil rule amendments. 252 In-
sofar as the Supreme Court has premised local option prescriptions 
on the need to address problematic local conditions or to experiment 
with promising measures, the withdrawn 1991 proposed revision in 
Rule 83 could advance these goals and limit inconsistency.253 
248 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (1995 amendment); see also supra notes 115, 123 and 
accompanying text. 
249 The Sixth Circuit is apparently the only court which has not. 
250 Illustrative are the Districts of Colorado, Maryland, and Nebraska. 
251 See, e.g., lsr CIR. R. 36.2; 4TH CIR. R. 36; 6TH CIR. R. 24. FRAP 33 recognizes 
that judges or officers might conduct settlement conferences. See, e.g., 8TH CIR. R. 
33A; 9Ttt CIR. R. 33-1; llTH CIR. R. 33-l(c). In fairness, the Conference may have 
been attempting to secure more uniformity or at least to insure that publication prac-
tices were in writing. See infra note 254. 
252 See supra notes 98-109, 236-37 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 106, 
110. 
253 See supra note 230 and accompanying text; infra notes 259-62 and accompany-
ing text. 
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When special circumstances require the application of diverse 
strictures in numerous appellate or district courts, however, the Court 
should retain or adopt provisions for local variation.254 For instance, 
FRAP 34's proviso that .authorizes local variations in oral argument 
may afford the requisite flexibility to address discrepancies in the size 
and complexity of appellate court caseloads and resources for resolv-
ing appeals.255 The local option prescription hi Civil Rule 16 concom-
itantly seems to facilitate the practice of judicial case management, 
which can differ significantly among districts, and to accommodate 
the need for particularized, disparate treatment of complex and sim-
ple lawsuits.256 
c. A Miscellany of Ideas 
Should numerous circuit judicial councils, districts, and judges 
fail to discharge their local review duties, even once the CJRA defini-
tively expires and simplifies monitoring by substantially reducing the 
number of local strictures that require analysis, the Judicial Confer-
ence or Congress might explore and implement other measures and 
may want to examine approaches that are relatively intrusive or per-
haps coercive. For example, a Conference committee or the FJC or 
Administrative Office personnel could help specific courts and judges 
complete review by offering additional expertise, information, or 
resources. 
In any event, the Conference or Congress should carefully evalu-
ate the possibility of establishing a centralized instrumentality, such as 
a standing committee on local procedures~ which would facilitate na-
tionwide effectuation of the mandates related to proliferation in the 
federal rules and the JIA. 257 This entity coul4 specifically serve as a 
clearinghouse and might assist or complement the efforts of councils, 
appellate and district courts, and judges by bringing expertise and in-
dependence, as well as a national perspective and oversight to these 
endeavors. The institution could collect, assess, and synthesize all rel-
254 FRAP 34 at least clearly authorizes this practice, thus reducing the element of 
surprise for non-local counsel and parties. See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
255 See, e.g., D.C. C1R. R. 34; 2o Cm. R. 34(d); 3o CIR. R. 34.1; see also Fed. R. App. 
P. 34. 
256 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16; see also supra notes llO, 216 and accompanying text. 
Congress and national and local rule revisors should attempt to limit proliferation by 
considering procedural changes' effects on it and on phenomena, such as judicial 
discretion, which facilitate prolif:eration. See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1590 n.13 & 
1627 n.237. 
257 See Carl Tobias, Some Realism About Federal Procedural Refonn, 49 FLA. L. REv. 49, 
79 (1997); see also Heiser, supra note l, at 580-81. · 
592 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:2 
evant local strictures; encourage, and even be authorized to compel, 
performance of the local review duties; and perhaps make suggestions 
respecting abrogation or modification to the Conference or Congress, 
if councils, courts, or judges do not cooperate. This instrumentality 
must recognize that the tasks envisioned are delicate and work closely 
with, and facilitate efforts of others, rather than be coercive. 
All entities and iRdividuals performing local procedural review 
should keep in mind, and capitalize on, the experience of the Local 
Rules Project which I recounted above. For instance, the Project has 
assembled voluminous, valuable information on, and possesses great 
expertise regarding, local measures and the institutions and people 
responsible for their growth, and it can contribute significantly to real-
ization of my recommendations for decreasing proliferation. 258 The 
Judicial Conference might even revitalize the Local Rules Project and 
perhaps enlarge the entity's charter. The Project could compile, as-
sess, and classify, in terms of consistency and redundancy, those local 
procedures that courts and judges have applied since the 1989 com-
pletion of its report, while the Project's new work might encompass 
strictures, such as individual-judge practices, which it did not include 
in the study more than a decade ago. 
D. Suggestions for Treating Problematic Local Conditions and 
for Experimenting 
The analysis above indicates that the disadvantages which local 
procedural proliferation imposes outweigh its benefits, but the evalua-
tion also suggests that the expanding application of local provisions, 
especially ones which are inconsistent or duplicative, serves several im-
portant purposes. Appellate courts, districts, and individual judges 
adopted and enforced many of these requirements to treat peculiar, 
problematic local conditions, such as expense and delay, which have 
arisen from the litigation explosion and have received minimal atten-
tion in the federal rules, or to experiment with promising measures 
that might warrant national implementation. 
Congress or the Supreme Court, therefore, should accord courts 
and judges the requisite flexibility to address unusual, difficult local 
situations or to test nascent mechanisms by revising those federal civil, 
appellate, bankruptcy, and criminal rules which govern the prescrip-
tion of local strictures. 259 Congress or the Court could enable appel-
late courts, districts, and judges to treat the circumstances and to 
258 See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text. 
259 Congress is the· preferable entity to institu~e this change because the modifica-
tion implicates questions of authority. See Levin, supra note 58, at 1585-87. 
2002] LOCAL FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 593 
experiment with a thorough, balanced approach, which might be 
modeled on the 1991 proposed amendment in Civil Rule 83 that the 
revisors withdrew out of respect for simultaneous CJRA testing. 25o 
The recommended change would have authorized districts which ob-
tained Judicial Conference permission to experiment for five years 
with local requirements that contravene federal rules or statutes. 
One, or a percentage, of the appellate and district courts could pro-
mulgate and enforce techniques, which respond to troubling condi-
tions, or might serve as laboratories for testing devices that appear 
sufficiently effective to deserve employment in additional courts. 
The 1991 suggested modification in Rule 83 included no criteria 
on which the Conference would premise its decisions regarding pro-
posals to apply local procedures that conflict with federal rules or the 
United States Code provisions.261 Congress or the Court could re-
quire appellate courts or districts to show that they need the measures 
for treating problematic loc,5ll situations or even to present empirical 
data indicCJ,ting the strictures' potential efficacy.262 
The recent experience under the CJRA and the decade of experi-
mentation which involved court-annexed arbitration could also in-
form future testing.263 For instance, both efforts suggested_ the need 
for centralized monitoring and for a few courts to deploy similar pro-
visions while gradually expanding experimentation with effective pro-
cedures. The appellate and district courts might consult their local 
rules committees and develop proposals, and the Conference could 
structure and coordinate testing. The experimentation that proceeds 
must receive stringent evaluation. When testing and assessment show 
the advisability of broader application, the Conference should ascer-
tain whether additional experimentation or nationwide use is 
indicated. 
Numerous ideas support the adoption and effectuation of this 
course of action. It capitalizes on the valuable model in the recom-
mended revision of Rule 83, on entities with relevant expertise, and 
on prior experience with the CJRA and court-annexed arbitration. 
The approach provides sufficient flexibility to apply promising mea-
sures, which will address problematic local circumstances, and to con-
duct testing which will foster the discovery and employment of 
strictures that revitalize and maintain the basic procedural tenets, 
while minimizing the disruption of daily dispute resolution. Moreo-
260 See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
261 See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note lll. 
262 The courts might rely on prior federal or state court experimentation. 
263 See supra note 230. 
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ver, the above suggestions apart from the recommendations for treat-
ing difficult local situations and experimenting would afford those 
responsible for the prescription, retention, and review of inconsistent 
and redundant local requirements another opportunity to modify the 
provisions as well as guidance for doing so. 
This method of proceeding is also somewhat circumscribed. For 
example, it treats local procedural proliferation more specifically than 
other integral features of current federal litigation which have been 
concomitants of proliferation. These central aspects include power's 
accretion in district courts, increasingjudicial discretion, and growing 
emphasis on the pretrial process and on managerial judging. Those 
phenomena's broad, structural, and ingrained nature and the obsta-
cles, such as judicial opposition, to greater change indicate that more 
fundamental reform should await the course of action's implementa-
tion. 254 The realization that the 1988 JIA the 1985 and 1995 rule revi-
sions were the only important developments in modern civil process 
which did not underlie the phenomena correspondingly attests to 
their entrenched character, the difficulty in attaining additional 
change, and the advisability of proceeding cautiously and of directly 
attacking proliferation.265 Some observers concomitantly consider 
procedure's present state so fragmented that it is best to secure a mea-
sure of stability with, for instance, a moratorium on reform before 
pursuing broader change.266 However, the comparatively narrow na-
ture of the complications which local proliferation presents and of the 
approach proffered indicate that it can be felicitously 
implemented. 267 
264 For example, the systemic character of judicial discretion, which perm~ates 
modern disputing and the federal rules, means that it would resist broad change. 
Managerial judging, which is primarily a style of judging, appears narrower and more 
malleable but is difficult to address thoroughly because many judges practice it and 
would oppose change. See]CR, supra note 71, at 74-75. 
265 See Tobias, supra note 48, at 839; see also Cavanagh, supra note 79, at 601-06. If 
Congress or the judiciary directly addresses the phenomena, they must cooperate be-
cause this will be crucial to success and the work will implicate delicate interbranch 
relationships typified by rule revision. See Mullenix, supra note 76, at 379-82, 
399-400; Tobias, supra note 15, at 1623. 
266 See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 76, at 379-82, 399-400; Robel, supra note 86, 
1449-50; see also Levin, supra note 86, at 900 (suggesting a preference for moratorium 
or national procedural commission to conduct kind of intensive analysis and meticu-
lous development of basic changes that may be indicated); Tobias, supra note 15, at 
1627 & n. 228 (same); id. at 1612 & n. 168 (alluding to moratoria); Yeazell, supra note 
60, at 676-78 (suggesting the need for painstaking development of changes). 
267 For example, conflicting local rules are a rather discrete problem, whose treat-
ment the CJRA has fostered by systematizing their adoption and emphasizing the dif-
ficulties posed. See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1422-27; Tobias, supra note 15, at 
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·" This manner of proceeding may seem to impose a few disadvan-
tages. For example, the course of action could limit experimentation 
or the application of measures which address unusual, troubling local 
conditions. Nonetheless, Rule 83's proposed revision, that would au-
thorize testing with inconsistent, creative techniques for improving lit-
igation, will minimize any potential loss of flexibility.268 Effectuating 
the mandates which cover local proliferation in the federal civil, ap-
pellate, bankruptcy, and criminal rules and in the ]IA might be expen-
sive, and cost was apparently a major reason for the truncated 
compliance witne1>sed.269 However, the expense entailed in halting 
the growth of conflicting and redundant local requirements should be 
comparatively small and could be reduced by employing volunteer as-
sistance of the bar or law professors.270 In short, these projected 
problems, which are relatively minor or can be treated, seem less sig-
nificant than the need to restrict inconsistent and repetitive local 
provisions. 0 
CONCLUSION 
Local procedural proliferation has detrimentally affected modern 
process. Increasing numbers of local strictures, many of which con-
flict with, or duplicate, federal rules or acts of Congress have created 
confusion, imposed grea~er cost and delay in federal practice, and fur-
ther balkanized federal procedure. If the institutions and individuals 
responsible for the expansion of inconsistent and redundant local 
measures implement the suggestions afforded in this Article, they 
should be able to limit proliferation and improve process in the 
twenty-first century. 
1621-24. Proliferation is pervasive and difficult to treat fully because many judges 
apply violative measures and will resist change. 
268 See supra note 230 and accompanying text. Courts could also invoke their sub-
stantial inherent authority. See, e.g., Chambers·v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 33 (1991). See 
generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural 
Constitution, 86 lowA L. RE.v. 735 (2001). 
269 Telephone Interview with David Pimentel, supra note 148; Telephone Inter-
view with Andrew Tietz, supra note 168; see also supra notes 168-72 and accompanying 
text. 
270 See supra notes 153-61, 230, 244-47 and accompanying text. 
